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Social power is a pervasive feature with acknowledged impact in a multitude of social 
processes. However, despite its importance, common approaches to social power inter-
actions in multi-agent systems are rather simplistic and lack a full comprehensive view of 
the processes involved. In this work, we integrated a comprehensive model of social power 
dynamics into a cognitive agent architecture based on an operationalization of different 
bases of social power inspired by theoretical background research in social psychology. The 
model was implemented in an agent framework that was subsequently used to generate 
the behavior of virtual characters in an interactive virtual environment. We performed 
a user study to assess users’ perceptions of the agents and found evidence supporting 
both the social power capabilities provided by the model and their value for the creation 
of believable and interesting scenarios. We expect that these advances and the collected 
evidence can be used to support the development of agent systems with an enriched 
capacity for social agent simulation.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the 
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Research on intelligent autonomous agents has long focused on developing mechanisms to improve how agents sense, 
keep a record of and interact with their environment [15,27,70]. As part of this progress, in recent years, there has been 
increasing interest in social concepts that may contribute to new advances concerning social intelligence and believability 
in agents [17,24]. The acknowledgment of the importance of these concepts has impacted research in several domains [53]. 
For instance, agents with a model of cultural dimensions were used to develop an intercultural training tool [55], and the 
application of social cognitive processes is a key factor in the development of virtual humans to train social skills, such as 
negotiation, interviewing and leadership [47].
Social power is one of the most pervasive social concepts in human societies because of its function as a social heuris-
tic [45] for decision-making. It combines diverse and complex decision-inﬂuencing social factors, such as formal/informal 
norms, resource/action dependencies and social status [16]. The impact of social power may be observed in a multitude 
of social processes, such as coordination, delegation, cooperation, hierarchy and alliance formation, resource allocation and 
negotiation [16,58,62]. Reinforcing this idea, it has been argued that power is a cognitive mediator for behavior that is 
fundamental for emulating many social phenomena that depend on the human social mind [17]. Given the ample impact 
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dilemma situations [3,78], the ability to understand power-based social dynamics and emulate them in cognitive agents is 
of fundamental importance for improving such agents’ interactive capabilities [14].
Although the role of power in agent behavior has previously been explored (e.g., [2,16,40,52]), signiﬁcant research gaps 
remain with regard to a comprehensive approach to social power, despite the promise of its use in both inter-agent [54] and 
human–agent interactions [64]. First, social power may derive from different bases (e.g., reward, coercion, legitimate, expert, 
or referent [37]) with particular dynamics, but many of these bases of power are frequently not addressed in agent models. 
In particular, most agent models explore social power dynamics related to legitimacy by using social norms and may include 
reward and coercion mechanisms, but expert and referent power are rarely considered. Second, even in cases in which we 
can relate agent models with some of these bases of social power, they are not modeled together as a comprehensive system. 
There is a lack of agent models that integrate each base of social power and its corresponding underlying factors into the 
agents’ processes of sensing, reasoning and strategic interaction with the environment. We see this as a shortcoming that 
limits the range of social situations that can be handled by such agent systems for either social simulation or the creation 
of interactive virtual environments.
Therefore, our motivation is to address this limitation by developing an agent model that integrates comprehensive 
social power dynamics into the decision mechanisms of a cognitive agent architecture. To achieve this, we ﬁrst explore 
the links between different bases of social power and their underlying factors, according to social science research, and 
propose a formalization of the different bases and their underlying mechanics. This formalization serves as the foundation 
for the development and implementation of a model that integrates social power processes into the typical agent’s decision 
process. We argue that by using this model, general social power dynamics are granted to the agents, empowering them 
with intelligent social power behavior that is independent of the context, thereby facilitating the adaptation of the agents 
to different situations.
Several areas of application can beneﬁt from agents endowed with social power. One is education, in which agents 
are often used to assist people in learning new skills by presenting area-speciﬁc challenges and adapting to the learner’s 
characteristics [41,69]. An example is a leadership training application in which a person training to become a leader would 
learn to eﬃciently exercise his/her social power over his/her employees. Another application area is social support, in which 
agents have been used to support people in coping with diﬃcult situations [79]. For instance, agent-based systems can 
be applied to aid individuals who are subject to intense social pressure (peer pressure) due to group pressure toward 
the adoption of unhealthy/negative group norms, which can lead to problems such as violence, bulimia, alcohol abuse or 
emotional distress [35]. An agent capable of reasoning about the social-power forces involved in social situations could help 
to analyze sources of pressure and propose strategies for resisting the negative inﬂuence of peer pressure. A third application 
area is entertainment; many games present rich worlds, including increasingly more convincing societies of agents, with the 
aim of increasing player engagement and “suspension of disbelief” [6]. The central goal for these agents (both allies [25]
and adversaries [80]) is to increase their believability by ensuring that they exhibit socially competent interactions and 
behaviors. For example, in role-playing games, agents that are socially intelligent with regard to social power could be 
used to create virtual actors that are capable of being either friendly or hostile, depending on the various social concepts 
that underlie social power. A ﬁnal example of a potential area of application is social simulation, in which the creation of 
multi-agent simulations is frequently used to explore human social processes. Social power simulations can be used to study 
societal behavior in response to changes in the parameters affecting social power dynamics and changes in the structure 
of the social environment. Such simulations can, for example, be used in training applications to assist health-care workers 
in coping with the complex social power dynamics involved in a hospital infection control setting [72] or for studies of 
leadership in small societies [81].
In the case of the application of socially intelligent agents in interactive systems (e.g., training applications, serious games 
and games for entertainment), the agents should present human-like qualities to improve the human–agent interaction. 
Humans are intrinsically social beings, and as such, they continuously attempt to understand the meaning of the actions of 
others. In fact, they attempt to understand actions performed by representations of people, as well (e.g., virtual agents [27]). 
Consequently, visual and/or intellectual believability are key to the effectiveness of an interactive experience [4]. These traits 
help users to imagine the experience as real without presenting conﬂicts that might hinder the “suspension of disbelief” and 
place the plausibility of the experience at risk. Because social power plays a key role in the cognitive processes that mediate 
behavior, it is also a key factor for ensuring the believability and effectiveness of an interactive agent system. Hence, to 
explore the applicability and potential impact in this area of the model proposed herein, we implemented the model in the 
virtual characters of a game scenario and performed a user study to assess users’ perceptions regarding the social power 
awareness of agents. As a result, we obtained evidence supporting the impact and value of the social power capabilities 
introduced by the model.
This document is structured as follows. In the section titled Related Work, we review previous relevant contributions 
regarding social power for agents. Then, we present the main theoretical background research applied in our proposed 
social power model, followed by the developed model itself and the agent architecture used to integrate it into typical 
agent processes. Afterward, we describe the implementation of the model and architecture in an agent framework and 
present the Social Theatre environment that was used to perform the user study to assess the impact of the model. Finally, 
we draw several conclusions.
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Before proceeding to the discussion of research addressing the issue of modeling social power, it is important to situate 
the issue of social power interaction in the context of multi-agent systems. A fundamental work that helps us to do so 
is that of Castelfranchi on the concept of social action [15]. At its core lies the claim that sociality emerges from agents’ 
goal-oriented minds and their mutual interference in a shared world. The coexistence of multiple agents means that the 
actions of one affect the goals and plans of the others. To cope with this situation, an agent has the option of either adapting 
its own goals/plans or changing the goals/plans of the interfering agent. Note that this interference can be either positive, 
facilitating one’s goals, or negative, hindering those same goals. The concept of social action is thus distinguished from the 
broader concept of action (interaction between an agent and the environment) by the deﬁnition that “a social action is an 
action that deals with another entity as an agent, i.e., as an active, autonomous, goal-oriented entity” [15].
This stance has a strong impact on the conceptualization of diverse aspects of sociality, such as assistance, cooperation 
and competition. A key element of social action is delegation, which can be summarized as one agent’s reliance on another 
to perform a given action. The precursor to an act of delegation is an agent’s recognition of another’s action that it likes, 
values or somehow depends on in order to achieve its goals. However, because the delegated agent is an autonomous 
and goal-oriented entity, the key problem becomes one of how to induce the delegated agent to perform or adopt the 
goal of performing the delegated action. It is at this stage of the social action that social power and inﬂuence are essential. 
According to Castelfranchi [15], the power of the delegating agent to inﬂuence the delegated agent arises based on the social 
power of the former over the latter. In effect, this capability of inﬂuence is how the delegating agent is able to modify the 
delegated agent’s beliefs and, consequently, its goals and intentions that might lead to the desired behavior. However, this 
key capability is not possible without the social power to support it, and thus, the modeling of social power is crucial. As 
acknowledged by Castelfranchi [15], social power that supports inﬂuence can originate from various basis, such as authority, 
sympathy or the exchange of rewards.
2.1. Modeling social power
The subject of social power, namely, the representation of power and the formalization of its associated dynamics, has 
previously been researched from several perspectives. The fundamental differences among the different research approaches 
lie in the underlying deﬁnition of power, i.e., the main focus of the approach being described.
One approach to power is based on autonomy and is rooted in an agent’s capability of pursuing its goals without 
the intervention of other agents. Hexmoor [40] conceptualizes power as a function of personal weights and liberties over 
preferences. Liberties express freedom/inhibition forces with regard to an agent’s decision and can be either internal (e.g., 
values and emotions) or external (e.g., limitations of the physical context). The weights affect the liberties according to 
an agent’s characteristics of individual rationality (corresponding to a preference for ensuring individual welfare) or social 
rationality (a preference for social welfare).
Much research is deeply rooted in the seminal work on Dependency Theory by Sichman and colleagues [74,75], which 
supports a taxonomy of dependence and the fundamental concepts for agent reasoning in groups through the formation 
of dependence networks. For Carabelea et al. [12], power is grounded on an agent’s individual powers, and social power 
is formalized as originating from the dependence relations of one individual regarding the individual powers of another. 
These individual powers are generically deﬁned as a combination of the capability and the entitlement (i.e., the right) to do 
something. Based on this deﬁnition, social power is identiﬁed in situations in which one agent depends on an individual 
power of another and both agents are aware of this dependence relation. Castelfranchi et al. [18] differentiate two types of 
dependence. First, non-social dependence characterizes a dependence relation targeting a resource (e.g., money). Second, so-
cial dependence characterizes a dependence relation targeting an action/ability of an agent. However, non-social dependence 
may give rise to social dependence. If an agent X controls a resource that is needed by another agent Y, then social de-
pendence arises. Agent X controls the resource, and therefore, agent Y depends on agent X’s control of that resource. These 
relations of dependence are the origin of inﬂuence interactions between agents, because one agent may promise/threaten 
another based on such a dependence situation. This notion of social power was also used by Sichman to study coalition 
formation based on social dependence [73]. Following similar underlying concepts, Castelfranchi [16] developed a con-
cept of social power arising from individual powers that include “internal powers” (e.g., skills) and “external powers” (e.g., 
resources). Based on this deﬁnition, the author explored how social power emerges from the inter-agent dependence of 
individual powers. The model was further expanded to include other bases of power that emerge from agents’ comparisons 
of individual powers, from the provision of assistance or the exchange of individual powers between agents, and from the 
combination of individual powers to achieve combined powers. In [7] Brainov and Sandholm relate dependence to utility-
based Decision Theory to enable reasoning with regard to power in multi-agent plans. Power is conceptualized based on 
the possible costs and damages to the agents involved in a given dependence situation that are expected as a result of that 
situation. These values are deﬁned as the differences in utility between an intended joint plan and a possible alternative 
plan offered by one of the agents. In this work, power is deﬁned as the capacity to harm another agent, i.e., to execute a 
plan that can lower the utility of another.
Another approach, adopted by López [52], addresses power from a normative perspective by emphasizing the part played 
by norms and roles in a group’s power structure and individual powers. In this work, López introduced a taxonomy of 
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group is subject or entitled. These powers are then operationalized in several group processes, such as agent membership 
in the established normative society, individual norm adoption and inter-agent goal delegation. Also following a normative 
approach to power, Jones and Sergot [43] presented a logical language for describing the institutionalized powers that 
arise in norm-governed institutions. At the core of this power conceptualization lies the concept of normative states of 
affairs that are realized based on the rights and obligations of the entities of a given institution or society. A fundamental 
issue discussed is the distinction between “permission to do” and “empowerment to do”, or institutionalized power. Such a 
difference might arise in a situation in which an individual has the power (within the institution) to perform an action, but 
the actual execution of that action might not be permitted (under certain constraints). In the developed framework, power 
is transferable, by some means of social inﬂuence, only when normatively established by the inheritance of institutional 
power. Inﬂuence is deﬁned as the control of the behavior of an institutionally empowered agent. The authors provide several 
examples of the expressive range of the introduced logical framework in the contexts of ecclesiastical institutions, faculty 
institutions and typical boss/employee relationships. The depicted situations encompass several social processes, such as 
delegation and authorization.
Adopting a cultural perspective, Mascarenhas et al. [56] developed the Social Importance Dynamics (SID) Model. It was 
developed to create agents that exhibit culturally adaptive behavior that is coherent and representative of a (speciﬁcally 
parameterized) underlying culture. The model is based on Kemper’s Status-Power Theory [46] because of its focus on daily 
cultural rituals. More speciﬁcally, the status dimension is focused on and modeled as social importance. By modeling this 
relational characteristic in an agent, the model represents the extent to which that agent is willing to act in the interest of 
another social entity above its own motivations. The model was implemented in an existing agent architecture [23] following 
the BDI paradigm, and its impact on the perception, deliberation and planning processes was investigated. Furthermore, to 
test the expressiveness and practical application of the model, it was used to create synthetic cultures for an intercultural 
training virtual environment.
A different approach to power relies on power indices, which are frequently used to measure the power of players in 
voting games. The measurement of power is performed by calculating the importance of a voter in the game. For instance, 
Bachrach et al. [2] conceptualizes power indices that explore power as a way of measuring the impact exerted by an agent 
on the outcomes of simple coalition games (i.e., games in which the outcomes can be classiﬁed only as successes or failures). 
The presented power indices measure the criticality of an agent in different possible coalitions.
Hayes et al. [39] assume power to derive from agent interaction through processes similar to those of economic 
exchanges [63]. Social power is regarded as an exchangeable natural resource in the agents’ environment, where it is replen-
ished or decays automatically. For one agent to inﬂuence another, it must transfer a given amount of power to the other. In 
such a situation, the target agent can resist the inﬂuencer by transferring a greater amount of power back. In this context, 
individuals strive to maximize their rewards while lowering their costs for inﬂuence.
Although not focused on power, reputation research is related to social power because reputation is a representation 
of how an individual is regarded in a society. One example of the quantiﬁcation of reputation by Sabater and Sierra [71]
relies on equations used to calculate individual reputations based on a database of individual impressions. The authors 
also explored a “Social Reputation” metric, which calculates a group-derived type of reputation combined with a type of 
reputation propagated from other members of the group. The transmission of reputation is therefore a very important 
mechanism to consider because it may affect the changes in power derived from reputation. This work was subsequently 
used to investigate social structures by incorporating the reputation dimension in a typical social network analysis.
Two other works that are not directly related to social power nevertheless incorporate certain aspects of the power of 
interactive virtual agents in the context of inﬂuence. From a social power perspective, inﬂuence is the exercise of power. 
Marsella et al. [54] developed the PsychSim agent-based system to simulate social interactions. Agents can affect each 
other’s beliefs and subsequent actions by means of direct interaction (direct messages) or by performing actions that are 
observed by other agents. The effectiveness of an inﬂuence interaction is determined with regard to ﬁve underlying factors 
extracted from a survey of the social psychology literature. These factors (some directly related to power, e.g., likability) 
affecting the process of interpersonal inﬂuence interactions capture the beliefs, perspectives and history of interactions 
of all participants. Prada et al. [64] developed the Synthetic Group Dynamics (SGD) model with the intent of improving 
believability in groups of synthetic characters designed to interact with humans. The strength of an individual’s proposed 
group interaction depends on its position in the group, which, in turn, depends on its social relations with others (i.e., social 
attraction and social inﬂuence). The dynamics of these social relations can be related to different bases of power and are 
operationalized in group interactions between the virtual agents and the player.
2.2. Discussion
To facilitate analysis of the surveyed work, we introduce a set of features identiﬁed as important for modeling social-
power-intelligent agents. When describing the different works above, we focused on the highlights of each, but these 
features will help us to perform a more complete and in-depth analysis. The features considered focus on two funda-
mental areas of interest, namely, the representation of social power in multi-agent systems and its operationalization, which 
are crucial for the modeling of social power in agents. A comparison of the surveyed works with regard to these features is 
presented in Table 1.
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Comparison of various approaches to social power. A table cell colored in green (or 
light gray) indicates that the corresponding model satisﬁes the requirements of the 
corresponding dimension, and a table cell colored in red (or dark gray) indicates 
that it does not.
Authors
So
ci
al
Po
w
er
Ba
se
s 
of
So
ci
al
 
Po
w
er
Ef
fe
ct
s 
of
So
ci
al
 
Po
w
er
So
ci
al
 
Sc
ie
nc
e
Ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
Su
sc
ep
ti
bi
lit
y 
&
In
ﬂ
ue
nc
e
So
ci
al
 
Po
w
er
St
ra
te
gi
es
Q
ua
nt
iﬁ
ca
ti
on
Hexmoor [40]
Carabelea et al. [12]
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Sabater et al. [71]
Marsella et al. [54]
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The ﬁrst main set of features represents Properties of Social Power and addresses the conceptualization of social 
power in terms of its origin, its deﬁnition and the effects associated with its use. The considered dimensions are as fol-
lows:
Social Power: a speciﬁc representation or a conceptualization of power that accounts for the social forces derived from an 
agent’s relationship with its social environment (beyond individual powers).
Bases of Social Power: the different individual resources (e.g., skills) or social resources (e.g., social norms) from which 
social power can originate. This dimension analyzes the representation of different bases of social power, with 
particular focus on the bases of the social power taxonomy introduced by French and Raven [37].
Effects of Social Power: the important potential effects of social power on the beliefs and plans of or social relations be-
tween individuals in a society. This dimension analyzes the representation of these effects.
Social Science Background: whether a model is based, inspired or closely related to any psychological/sociological the-
oretical background research (behavior models, studies, etc.) that support the way in which social power is 
conceptualized.
The second main topic is Operationalization of Social Power and addresses the modeling of the mechanisms through 
which social power can be manipulated:
Susceptibility & Inﬂuence: the existence of a mechanism through which individuals can be affected or affect others at the 
level of their beliefs, plans or goals through representations of social power.
Social Power Strategies: the modeling of strategies that can be used to emphasize an agent’s social power (e.g., a social 
attraction relation or a threat).
Quantiﬁcation: a numerical representation of social power that can be used to operationalize it.
Previous research focusing on social power has presented and explored several possible representations, but these repre-
sentations also have several shortcomings with regard to the operationalization of social power in intelligent agent systems. 
One of the identiﬁed problems is the typical high level of abstraction of the developed models, which limits the range of 
social behaviors that can be simulated using those models [2,16,39,40,43,56]. Although several works have addressed bases 
of social power to some level, in most cases, only one or two of the bases are addressed [7,12,18,43,71,74,75]. Furthermore, 
some researchers have related their conceptualizations to speciﬁc social constructs, but in the end, there is no detailed 
link between these constructs and their operationalization [12,16,56]. Furthermore, in some studies [12,71], the contexts 
for which the models were developed are more adequate for a structural analysis at the society level than for an agent 
behavioral model that operates in a non-deterministic and dynamic environment.
Another problem with current models [16,43,52] is their lack of mechanisms for integrating social powers into the agents’ 
processes. For instance, how do conﬂicting social powers interfere with each other? Even when certain basic mechanisms 
are provided, they are typically applied to different social powers in a similar manner, although, in fact, different social 
powers have different dynamics [39,40,52]. As a result, the behavioral expressiveness potential of existing models either is 
very limited or has not been explored.
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ing social power. However, such studies only superﬁcially address the processes associated with social power in interactions, 
their different underlying factors and their interdependencies (a taxonomy of social powers) [64]. Because social power is 
not the focus, these systems speciﬁcally lack social power operationalization mechanisms that can emulate different modes 
of social power utilization and their feedback effects on agents [54].
Additionally, in the surveyed research, there is rarely any reference to the extensive background research on social power 
that has been performed in the ﬁeld of social sciences, which could provide a stronger theoretical basis for the developed 
social power models. The works of Marsella et al. [54] and Prada et al. [64] do acknowledge this theoretical background but 
are unrelated to social power. Two notable exceptions are the work of Castelfranchi [16], in which his model is compared 
with several social power theories from the social sciences, and that of Mascarenhas et al. [56], which present the SDI model 
inspired by the Status-Power Theory [46]. Similarly, two of the least widely addressed topics are the effects of social power 
and the utilization of social power strategies. Several works address the effects of exerting social power. The cost/damage 
mechanism presented by Brainov et al. [7] and even the mechanism of social power transfer as presented by Hayes et al. [39]
capture some of the consequences of using social power. However, if such an analysis is not supported by a more in-depth 
evaluation of the origin of the costs, then it provides little insight into the real effects in terms of changes to the underlying 
factors of social power, such as trust or social attraction. As a result, there has been little focus on understanding how 
different social power factors impact agents’ social reality, which could be used to support simulations with evolving social 
power dynamics. Social power strategies are, to some extent, addressed in the work of Sichman et al. [74,75], Carabelea et 
al. [12] and Castelfranchi [16], in which a dependence analysis is used for the selection of partners or for determining group 
membership. Nonetheless, there is still a gap in current research on this topic because such approaches only indirectly 
address the wielding of social power as intended by a social power strategy. Regarding the quantiﬁcation dimension, several 
works [40,54,56] can be used as an inspiration for quantifying social power.
Furthermore, there has been almost no focus on understanding the link between social power models and possible agent 
cognitive processes (as identiﬁed in theoretical background research) that could be used to operationalize these models in 
cognitive agent applications. Given these shortcomings, we believe that it is essential to conceptualize social power processes 
and integrate them with the typical cognitive processes of intelligent agent. This will enable coherent social interactions in 
which agents can strategically use their social power over other agents and users in dynamic and uncertain environments.
3. Theoretical background
We argue that during the process of designing social power mechanisms, it is of fundamental importance to support 
modeling decisions based on the background provided by social psychology research. There is an extensive body of literature 
and research on social power that can provide the desired insights. By guiding the conceptualization process with insights 
from theoretical background research, we leverage the knowledge of experts on social power and, in this way, provide a 
more solid basis for creating a computational model.
We begin by presenting and discussing various approaches to social power in social psychology and then follow with a 
discussion exploring how the surveyed research inspired the core of a social power model for agents.
3.1. Social power in social psychology
Over the past century, much research has been performed, comprising diverse attempts and perspectives, toward an 
understanding of social power [34]. As such, social power theories may be categorized from various perspectives [9,34,63]. 
However, for an attempt to model social power in a cognitive agent architecture, a particularly beneﬁcial categorization is 
one that differentiates theories according to the stage of the social power interaction process to which they apply. Fiske and 
Berdhal categorized several theories of social power by placing them in a “causal continuum from source to effect” [34]. In 
Fig. 1, we present this categorization alongside the key theories representative of each associated category, which we will 
brieﬂy discuss here. These theories are among the most relevant theories arising from studies of social power in the social 
sciences.
According to this categorization, social power may be modeled at three distinct levels:
Outcome Control Social power is conceptualized as a structural property of social relations.
Potential for Inﬂuence Social power is conceptualized as the capacity to induce forces that cause inﬂuence.
Inﬂuence Social power is conceptualized based on its effects.
Emerson [28] introduced one of the most inﬂuential theories of social power in which social power is modeled from 
the perspective of Outcome Control. According to Emerson, social power is a property of a social relation and cannot exist 
outside of the conceptualization of a dyadic relationship.1 Social power is thus deﬁned in terms of dependence: “power 
1 This dyadic relationship need not necessarily occur only between two persons. In fact, it can be any one of the following: a person–person relationship, 
a group-person relationship or a group–group relationship.
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approaches used to study social power. References: Emerson [28]; French & Raven [37]; Dhal [20].
resides implicitly in the other’s dependency” [28]. More speciﬁcally, the social power of one actor, A, over another, B, is 
equal to the dependence of B on A. The deﬁnition of dependence between two actors is based on two characteristics: “The 
dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly proportional to A’s motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and 
(2) inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside of the A–B relation” [28].
Another of the most inﬂuential [9,28,34,35] and highly regarded bodies of research on social power is the work of French 
and Raven [37,68], which is representative of the modeling of social power in terms of the Potential for Inﬂuence. In this 
approach, social power is deﬁned as a result of diverse psychological forces that have the potential to direct a person’s 
behavior. Lewin and Cartwright were two of the most important proponents of conceptualizing social power as a potential 
[13,51]. Based on this notion, the speciﬁcity of social power is emphasized. An individual may have social power over a 
certain aspect of another (e.g., how an employee performs his tasks) but none over other aspects (e.g., how friendly an 
employee is to other people). The main purpose of such a study is to identify the major bases of social power in dyadic 
relations such that their different effects may be conceptually differentiated:
Reward power stems from the ability of one individual to mediate rewards for another. An example of this base of social 
power is as follows: a factory manager tells a worker that if he increases production, then he will receive a bonus 
payment.
Coercive power stems from the ability of one individual to mediate punishments for another. An example of this base of 
social power is as follows: a factory manager tells a worker that if he does not increase production, then he will 
be ﬁred.
Legitimate power stems from internalized values that give one individual the authority to inﬂuence another. An example 
of this base of social power is as follows: in a family, a parent instructs a child to be home before midnight.
Referent power stems from the identiﬁcation of one individual with another. An example of this base of social power is as 
follows: a person asks a friend for help in studying for an upcoming exam.
Expert power stems from one individual’s perception of another’s higher knowledge. An example of this base of social 
power is as follows: a physician instructs a patient to follow a given medical prescription.
In addition to this work on the bases of social power, Raven also introduced the Power/Interaction Model [66,68], which 
explores the links between the bases of social power and their operationalization in an inﬂuence interaction. According 
to the authors, there are three aspects that have a strong impact on an inﬂuence attempt: the Mode of Inﬂuence, the 
Preparatory Devices and the Motivation for Inﬂuence. The Mode of Inﬂuence concerns the fact that the effectiveness of an 
inﬂuence attempt appears to be a function of both the bases of power and the means by which that power is exerted. The 
manner of exertion, can be, for example, loud, forceful, threatening, sarcastic, soft, friendly, or humoring. The Preparatory 
Devices are the enablers or emphasizers of a given base of social power; for example, “to use coercion, it is sometimes 
necessary to ﬁrst make the target realize that the agent has both the means and the will to follow through on the threat” 
[66]. The Motivation for Inﬂuence comprises the various motivational factors that might inﬂuence the choice of which 
bases of social power are to be used in an inﬂuence attempt. For example, such factors might include the attainment of 
extrinsic goals, the desire to adhere to social norms or even a need for status. The Power/Interaction Model also deﬁnes 
the main stages underlying the cognitive process of an inﬂuence interaction. Because there are always two participants in 
an inﬂuence interaction, it is presented from both perspectives (those of the inﬂuencing and the inﬂuenced persons). This 
model connects the conceptualization of the cognitive process of an inﬂuence interaction with the previously introduced 
bases of social power.
Another work in the “Potential for Inﬂuence” category, which has recently been used as the basis for the creation of 
culturally appropriate agents [56], is the Status-Power Theory presented by Kemper [46]. This theory focuses on the study 
of the compliance of an individual with the (implicit or explicit) request of another through status or power. Status repre-
sents an abstract capacity (with no speciﬁc capacity determinants) to gain compliance from another individual through that 
individual’s voluntary action. By contrast, power is conceptualized as the ability to gain compliance through non-voluntary 
means (e.g., coercion, threats, force), i.e., the capacity to compel non-voluntary compliance regardless of any personal resis-
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and not to the different resources that give rise to that social power. A status claim is made by an individual attempting to 
inﬂuence another; if that fails (status is not conferred), an individual can use his/her power to require the other to confer 
status to him/her.
In another widely referenced work, Dhal [20] introduced a different perspective on social power, modeling it based on 
empirical data concerning its effects. This work is representative of the modeling of social power in terms of Inﬂuence. 
Social power is seen as a person’s capacity to cause another to do something that he/she would not otherwise do. More 
speciﬁcally, an individual’s amount of social power over a target individual performing an action, when the ﬁrst exerts 
some means of inﬂuence, depends on the effect of that means of inﬂuence on the target’s decision to perform the action. 
Thus, social power is measured as the difference between the probability of the action being performed when the means of 
inﬂuence is applied and the probability of it being performed when the means of inﬂuence is not applied.
Based on this simple deﬁnition, the author compared the amounts of social power present in a society of actors. Two 
important properties discussed were the possibility of ranking the different actors and the transitiveness of the relationships 
of social power. This conceptualization of social power was also used to rank senators’ inﬂuence on senate decisions based 
on previously collected data (from 1946–1954) concerning two types of actions: those “working for” and “working against” 
a bill on foreign and tax policy.
However, we wish to model social power and its effects based on atomic factors and to simulate social power interactions 
based on those factors. As such, approaches such as Dhal’s, which deﬁne social power based on observations of its effects 
and do not consider the origins or underlying factors of that social power, are not adequate for our modeling purposes. 
Dhal’s approach is especially useful for post-interaction analyses (social power ranking) in which all empirical data on the 
interactions of interest are available.
3.2. From social psychology to agent modeling
In line with Emerson’s conclusion that “power is a property of the social relation” [28], we argue that the cornerstone 
of and most pervasive factor inﬂuencing social power is the existence of some type of valued relationship. If a given rela-
tionship is valued by one of its members, then that member depends on the relationship and, consequently, depends on 
the other member. This valuation confers social power to the other member because the preservation of the relationship 
ultimately relies as much on the actions of one member as those of the other.3 Indeed, Emerson’s conceptualization of social 
power in terms of dependence captures the possibility of capitalizing on these valued relationships in a simple framework. 
Dependence is thus a very useful abstraction that enables us to perform structural analyses of agent societies [5,7,74] and 
to operationalize various concepts of social power [12,16]. However, the same abstraction that helps us to pinpoint the 
fundamentals amid a multitude of deﬁnitions of social power means that this conceptualization is also too abstract to, by 
itself, enable the creation of intelligent agents that are capable of strategic social power interactions. The reason for this 
is that the abstraction eliminates many of the subtleties that differentiate and shape social power in a society (e.g., the 
leveraging of attraction or normative relations associated with different effects). Emerson’s theory is perfectly adequate for 
the aforementioned purposes, but for an agent society in which different types of social relations have different effects and 
the social structure itself is continuously changing, a semantically stronger framework of social power is needed.
As Dhal [20] argued, saying that “A has power over B – is not very interesting, informative, or even accurate”. It is at 
this point that more characteristics of social power must be deﬁned to create a semantically stronger framework, and thus, 
the research of French and Raven [37,66,68] becomes especially relevant. French and Raven present diverse contributions 
related to differentiating and deﬁning categories of bases of social power, the associated means of inﬂuence, their range and 
certain associated effects. It is also at this stage of the discussion that the fundamental difference between the repeatedly 
mentioned bases of social power and their actual utilization is exposed. As Dhal accurately put it, “the base of an actor’s 
power consists of all the resources – opportunities, acts, objects, etc. – that he can exploit in order to affect the behavior of 
another” [20, p. 203]; however, “the base is inert, passive. It must be exploited in some fashion if the behavior of others is 
to be altered” [20, p. 203].
Even though at ﬁrst glance, these theories may seem disjunctive and incompatible, we argue that this is not the case and 
that, in fact, the theories may be combined into a single functional framework. Emerson’s [28] dependence may be seen as 
the atomic element of social power, and French and Raven’s bases of social power may be seen as broad, distinct (in source, 
effect, etc.) categories of prototypical types of dependences in social relationships. A mapping of the different bases of social 
power to a conceptualization of dependence as social power is easily recognized in the work of Koslowsky and Schwarzwald 
[48], which establishes an interaction model based on French and Raven’s bases of social power [37], and also in Raven’s 
Power/Interaction Model [66]. In that work, the “motivational investment” of Dependency Theory is seen as the “motivation 
for complying” and the availability of dependence only depends on the number of similar relations in a given society.
Based on this, we may then associate different types of dependence relationships with the speciﬁc characteristics of 
each base of social power as deﬁned by French and Raven [37] and, in this way, combine the fundamental contributions of 
2 All determinants are characterized in the status and power dimensions.
3 A mutually valued relationship, for instance, a relation of mutual attraction, confers social power to both actors.
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both theories for the operationalization of social power interactions. Interestingly, the authors have already provided various 
aspects of their fundamental interrelatedness. One example of this is the connection established by Emerson [28] between 
his conceptualization of social power, the concept of group norms as prescriptions of behavior for all group members and 
the concept of roles as prescriptions of behavior for speciﬁc group members assuming a particular role. This link perfectly 
maps to the base of legitimate social power as described by French and Raven. Another example is French and Raven’s 
[37] discussion of “level observability”, which is essentially the dependence of the effectiveness of a social power on the 
motivational conditions that support it (e.g., a worker in a factory can have different productivities depending on whether 
the boss is present or absent).
Additionally, Raven [66] has introduced another fundamental contribution to the development of a computational model 
for social-power-based interactions. Raven introduced the Power/Interaction Model, which provides a conceptual framework 
exposing and discussing the main social-power-related cognitive processes of both participants in an inﬂuence interaction 
(see Fig. 2). This framework provides invaluable insight for the modeling and operationalization of social power interactions 
in an agent architecture.
When comparing French and Raven’s theory [37] with Kemper’s Status-Power Theory [46], we can observe a difference 
in the levels of analysis of the different types of social power. In the Status-Power Theory, individuals’ interactions are 
explained at the social level and generically include diverse social forces or pressures derived from diverse social constructs 
that operate on the individual. This conceptualization of power characterizes it as an individual’s personal capabilities that 
he/she can use to gain compliance and possibly status, which will then result in more voluntary compliance in future 
interactions. From the perspective of French and Raven, the status/conferral dynamics resulting from the use of power 
consist of different effects derived from social-power-based interactions that affect the social power structure (e.g., increased 
liking or decreased perceived expertise) and, therefore, the subsequent potential power that individuals possess in the 
society and can use to exert inﬂuence (claim status in subsequent interactions). Further evidence of the link between these 
theories is the conceptualization of the different forces (personal and social) acting on an individual, which is present 
in both theories. A relation between the status and power dimensions and the taxonomy of social powers can easily be 
identiﬁed. For instance, status has a clear relation with the legitimate (recognition of norms) and expert (acknowledgment 
of known expertise credentials) types of social powers, whereas the power dimension can easily be related to the coercive 
dimension (explicit utilization of coercion).4
Although French and Raven present a simple and operational taxonomy of the constituents of social power, their dynam-
ics are not explored in a similarly systematic way, which makes it diﬃcult to understand any basic underlying mechanism 
of social power dynamics, namely, a type of interaction and the associated effects, in terms of their utilization. By contrast, 
Kemper’s perspective offers an interesting contribution to attempts to model social power dynamics because it provides 
a generic social power dynamics mechanism that can be applied to the diverse constituents of Raven’s conceptualization 
of social power. Based on Kemper’s perspective regarding the claiming/conferral of power/status, the relation between the 
4 Based on personal communication and correspondence with Theodore D. Kemper on the topic of “Status-Power Theory and the French and Raven Bases 
of Power”, from February to May 2014.
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For example, in an expert power situation, if a given actor uses an expertise strategy (“You should do this because I have 
more expertise on this topic”), then that actor is explicitly making a claim of higher expert power. If the target accepts this 
claim, then the target is conferring a higher expert power to the actor and the claim becomes permanent. If the claim is 
not accepted, then this means that the target confers less power than the actor expected. Similarly, even in the context of 
a non-strategic interaction (a simple request to perform a given task without explicit support for that request), if the target 
recognizes the actor to have higher expert power (confers higher expert power to the actor), then the actor’s claim is simply 
met. In the case of a refusal, the target confers a lower expert social power to the actor. Similar reasoning can be applied 
to various factors that underlie the bases of social power as introduced by French and Raven. Finally, by applying Kemper’s 
dynamics-based reasoning framework to the strategic utilization of French and Raven’s bases of social power, we can actu-
ally model a wider range of social power strategies than those considered in Kemper’s model. This is possible because the 
claims made by an individual can be focused on strategies other than coercion, such as promises, expertise emphasis, etc.
3.3. Supporting individualized agent behavior
The individual differences among people are factors in determining the diversity of behaviors observed in human soci-
eties. To capture this dimension of distinct behavior in humans, in this work, we also strive to create agents that are able to 
exhibit individualized behaviors. However, to achieve this, we must understand which of the factors that impact individual 
differences are related to social power dynamics, how they affect these dynamics and how they can be integrated into a 
conceptualization of social power. From the theoretical background survey, two dimensions stand out as being intimately 
related to social power dynamics: motivations and personality [66].
Motivation can be described as the driving force(s) behind human behavior that causes people to take and sustain action. 
Although motivations can vary signiﬁcantly with individual context, there are certain motivational factors that are present 
in a wide variety of contexts and have therefore been identiﬁed as more pervasive and included in theories of motivation.
Of the many theories of human motivation, one of the most widely used and one that is most strongly related to social 
power is McClelland’s Human Motivation Theory [57]. This theory uses three fundamental needs to explain people’s actions 
in an organizational context:
Achievement – the need to set and accomplish goals and to take calculated risks to accomplish those goals.
Aﬃliation – the need to be liked, or the need to belong to the group.
Power – the need to control and inﬂuence others, or to enjoy status and recognition.
The theory states that all people have these three fundamental motivators, regardless of other individual characteristics, 
such as gender, culture, and age. By analyzing these dimensions, we can easily relate them to some of the bases of social 
power (e.g., we can relate aﬃliation to referent power) and to the motivational cognitive processes in the Power/Interaction 
Model.
Personality is, by deﬁnition, related to the characterization of individual differences by relating them to patterns of 
behavior. There are many theories that provide various alternative approaches to modeling personality, but one of the most 
widely acknowledged is Costa and McCrae’s ﬁve-factor model (or Big 5) [19]. This model characterizes individual differences 
based on ﬁve dimensions of personality traits. A personality trait deﬁnes stable personal characteristics that are associated 
with a speciﬁc pattern of behavior. The ﬁve factors identiﬁed in the model are as follows:
Openness to experience: inventive/curious versus consistent/cautious.
Conscientiousness: eﬃcient/organized versus easy-going/careless.
Extraversion: outgoing/energetic versus solitary/reserved.
Agreeableness: friendly/compassionate versus analytical/detached.
Neuroticism: sensitive/nervous versus secure/conﬁdent.
Even with a clear representation of different patterns of behavior, we still need to understand how these patterns relate 
to social power. This gap has been addressed in the work of Karkoulian et al. [44], which identiﬁes several correlations 
between the characteristics of the ﬁve-factor model and preference for the utilization of different bases of social power 
according to French and Raven’s taxonomy.
Modeling individual differences between agents based on these theoretical background theories has two additional ad-
vantages beyond enabling the creation of individualized agent behavior. First, it helps to reduce the number of free variables 
in the model that are related exclusively to the model, thereby facilitating the authoring process and the creation of agent 
simulations. A second advantage is that linking the agent model to these theories enables us to take advantage of existing 
questionnaires to assess people’s ratings according to these models and create simulations using real data.
5 Power strategies are related to “Preparatory Devices” in the Power/Interaction Model [66].
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Based on the discussion presented in Section 3.1, we conceptualize social power as a potential force [34]. As such, the 
working deﬁnition we use is adapted from Lewin’s [51] and Cartwright’s [13] deﬁnitions of power:
“The Social Power of A over T regarding a possible behavior of T is the resultant potential force that A can induce on T toward the 
realization of that behavior.”
Based on Lewin’s deﬁnition, we characterize power as a potential force that can be induced but might or might not be 
used. Based on Cartwright’s deﬁnition, we characterize the speciﬁcity of power toward a particular behavior. Finally, we also 
apply the concept of “resultant” to the potential force characterization to reﬂect the integrative nature of social power with 
regard to its different origins from diverse bases. Considering this deﬁnition of social power, we deﬁne inﬂuence as follows:
“The Inﬂuence of A over T regarding a possible behavior of T is the effective utilization of the resultant potential social-power force 
wielded by A to induce T to perform a speciﬁc desired behavior.”
Regardless of the links that exist between different categories of social power (Section 3.2), by using this deﬁnition, we 
situate our approach within the Potential for Inﬂuence category (see Fig. 1). This approach enables us to readily account for 
the dissonances in social power (believed and actual) that agents might encounter in inﬂuence interactions. In considering 
diverse bases of social power, we support the ﬂexibility of the deﬁnition to express many different social power situations, 
thereby avoiding the lack of expressiveness that can result from oversimpliﬁcation. Furthermore, by endowing social power 
with speciﬁcity toward particular behaviors, we are able to account for the particular dynamics of each base of social power 
in the social power ecology of a given social environment.
According to Lakoff and Johnson [50], this deﬁnition of social power as a potential force can be regarded as a conceptual 
metaphor. Such a metaphor is very useful because it helps us to deﬁne one conceptual domain based on the understanding 
of another. However, one must be aware that the value of this approach is limited by the possibility of inconsistencies 
between the two conceptual domains or imperfections in the conceptual mapping. Inconsistencies in the metaphor can cause 
us to overlook valuable aspects of the concept that we are attempting to model. For instance, in the metaphor “argument is 
war”, a very strong focus might be placed on the “ﬁghting” aspect of an argument, while the potential “cooperative” aspect 
is completely obfuscated. The imperfections of such a conceptual mapping are related to details of the domain to be deﬁned 
that simply are not mappable to the metaphorical domain. As such, we must not use these metaphors as literal descriptions 
of reality but rather as structuring element, while still retaining the complexity and speciﬁcity of the concept we are trying 
to conceptualize.
Before the developed model of social power is introduced, it is important to clearly understand the elements partici-
pating in a social power interaction process and to understand the perspectives of these different elements regarding the 
interaction. The dynamics of the social power interaction process vary depending on how such social power is perceived 
and leveraged in different situations. To analyze this, we need to consider three core elements that are present in all social 
power interactions:
Actor (A): an individual who exerts social power over the behavior of another.
Target (T): the individual whose behaviors are affected by the actor’s social power.
Behavior (C): the behavior executed by the target in a given interaction. Note that this behavior may be extended from 
the concept of (physical) action to include other types of changes, such as changes in beliefs, without losing any 
behavioral expressiveness. For example, in the case of a social power interaction acting on a belief regarding the 
position X of an object Y, the corresponding action can be to “update the belief that object Y is at position X”.
In any social-power-based interaction, these elements are related to the target’s reasoning about the actor’s social power 
regarding the execution of a given behavior. However, the dynamics of a social power interaction vary signiﬁcantly depend-
ing on the awareness of the participating individuals, which individual initiates the interaction and the manner in which 
the power is invoked.
The simplest situation is one in which the actor merely exists in the context of the target and the target must consider 
the social power relations between the two before performing an action. In this case, the target’s personally motivated action 
is the behavior being evaluated and the social power is invoked only implicitly because there is no direct communication 
between the participants. Consider a situation in which the actor is a police oﬃcer standing on a sidewalk near a book shop. 
Additionally, it is forbidden to park cars in front of the shop, and the target is a driver intending to park near the book shop 
despite his awareness that it is forbidden to park there. The simple presence of the actor will probably dissuade the target 
from parking near the book shop. If he does park there, the police oﬃcer will probably punish him with a ﬁne for illegal 
parking. Here, although no explicit command is issued by the actor, the target is still reasoning about the social powers 
of other individuals in the area (in this case, the actor/police oﬃcer) regarding his own actions without being directly 
prompted by them (the actor). Interestingly, this reasoning process of the target occurs regardless of the actor’s awareness, 
which depends on the police oﬃcer’s intentions. In a case in which the actor is aware, the police oﬃcer would be there 
12 G. Pereira et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 241 (2016) 1–44precisely to dissuade illegal parking. Alternatively, the police oﬃcer could also be simply standing on the sidewalk taking 
a break from work, with no intention of dissuading illegal parking; however, the effect on the target would be the same. 
Finally, we note that the context in which the police oﬃcer is present might be a simple mental context for the target, i.e., 
the target could simply imagine the possibility of the police oﬃcer’s presence (for instance, based on previous experiences) 
and be inﬂuenced in a similar manner.
A different situation occurs when the interaction is initiated not by the behavior of the target but by a command from 
the actor directing the target to perform a given behavior. In this case, both actor and target are always aware of the 
social-power-based interaction, but the way in which social power is invoked can still be implicit or explicit. As an example, 
imagine a situation in which an actor asks a target to open a door. If both individuals share the same belief that the actor is 
entitled to be in that room, then the target will comply without asking for any type of credentials. This is a case in which 
social power is invoked implicitly. However, if the target does not share this belief, then he/she will probably6 not comply 
with the request to open the door. The actor could address this belief mismatch by again requesting the same behavior from 
the target, accompanied by the presentation of some type of certiﬁcation to communicate his legitimacy (the basis of his 
social power) to enter the room. The latter scenario, in which a social power dispute arises from the incompatible beliefs 
of the participants, represents a case in which social power is explicitly invoked. This assertion is related to the use of 
social power strategies, which are employed by an individual to emphasize his/her social power bases (in this case, his/her 
certiﬁcation) to leverage his/her social power. This and other more complex strategies (e.g., assertion, deception, threat and 
manipulation [29,30]) are commonly used in interpersonal interactions.
In the presented types of interactions, there is the common element that the target always performs social-power-based 
reasoning7 with regard to a behavior before deciding whether to comply with it. Note that this is independent of the 
individual who initiated the interaction, and although the actor might also perform social-power-based reasoning before 
commanding the target to perform some behavior, this is not always the case. In the ﬁrst type of interaction, the actor 
might not even be aware of the speciﬁc social power situation.
Another important aspect of a social-power-based interaction that could extend this interaction process is the presence 
of multiple inﬂuencing agents (multiple actors or supporters for the actor). It has been acknowledged in the literature 
[45] that the presence of other individuals (beyond the actor and target) can either favor or hinder the inﬂuence being 
exerted, thus effectively impacting the inﬂuence process. The impact can originate from different causes. An example of 
this is related to personal image management [16]. For instance, imagine a situation in which an adolescent smokes when 
hanging out with his friends as a symbol of his adulthood. He does this to avoid the negative image impact that it could 
have on his parents, who strongly advocate against smoking, and if, for some reason (e.g., a graduation celebration), his 
parents and friends were simultaneously present, the adolescent would be strongly inﬂuenced not to smoke by the mere 
presence of his parents. These multiple inﬂuence dynamics are an interesting topic of research, but in this work, we focus 
on the fundamental inﬂuence dynamics, i.e., those that occur at a dyadic level. This would appear to limit the types of 
factors that can be used in modeling social power to those that are strictly dyadic in their conceptualization. However, this 
is not the case because, for example, group-level concepts such as social groups and social norms can also be considered by 
individuals when reasoning about dyadic interactions.
4. SAPIENT: a model for agent social power
In this section, we present the developed model of social power: SAPIENT – SociAl-Power-Intelligent agENTs. In the basic 
conceptualization of social power that underlies this model, social power is regarded as a potential force [13,51,37] affecting 
an agent’s decision (see Section 3.4). Additionally, to address the limitations of conceptual metaphors, as discussed by Lakoff 
and Johnson [50], we must also capture the complexity and speciﬁcity of social power. For this purpose, we model a broad 
range of bases of social power following the work of French and Raven [66,68]. In doing so, we increase the expressiveness 
of our model by differentiating among different bases of power and their underlying factors, thereby creating distinct social 
power dynamics. The reason for using this taxonomy of social powers is that it is one of the most inﬂuential and highly 
regarded theories of social power [9,28,34,35], which has been repeatedly scrutinized over the years [42,48,49,60,67,77], 
and thus provides a strong basis for our work. We begin by introducing basic deﬁnitions and mechanisms, followed by the 
conceptualization of the different bases of social powers and a discussion of their behavioral expressiveness.
4.1. Initial considerations
The goal of the social power model that we will present in this section is to enable the representation and manipulation 
of social power concepts in an agent system independently of the preferred type of agent implementation. For example, an 
implementation might rely on a utility-based system in which the values of most variables are deﬁned by attempting to 
6 The belief regarding entitlement is relevant only to the base of legitimate social power; other bases could also be at play, and thus, even if the actor 
does not have permission to be present, the target could still open the door. A base of social power categorizes the type of attributes (social resources) 
that confer a given social power to an individual [37]. For instance, bases of legitimate social power include both formal and informal norms, contracts and 
interpersonal commitments [12].
7 Even if at an unconscious level.
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quantify them based on other values or characteristics that contribute to their deﬁnition. By contrast, in several rule-based 
systems, the variables are simply set to represent the desired scenario and then adjusted to correctly match the desired 
behaviors. As such, throughout the description of the model in this section, we will introduce several variables without 
specifying their ranges. Because the ranges of values strongly depend on the type of implementation used and the scenario 
a researcher intends to model, the task of normalizing and adjusting these ranges of values should be carefully performed 
when modeling a speciﬁc scenario. The normalization is especially important in a context in which different variables are 
combined to model some integrative concept, such as social power. Nonetheless, to facilitate description of the model, we 
will characterize each variable as one of the following types:
Positive/Negative – can assume a positive, negative or zero value.
Positive – can assume only values greater than or equal to zero.
Probability – assumes a value in a probability range (e.g., typically represented by [0, 1] ∈R).
4.2. Social power decision mechanism
The function of social power as a social heuristic is relevant in a context in which an agent must decide among multiple 
possible actions that it can perform. Typical approaches to such decisions include performing some type of assessment of 
the value to the agent offered by each of the actions and, for example, choosing the action with the highest value as the 
one to be performed. Such an assessment can be conducted in different ways, from a directly speciﬁed table of values to 
an algorithm that performs a weighted analysis of several factors that are relevant for the current context. In our approach, 
such a value assessment is retained, as it plays an important part in the agent’s decision, but we do not focus on how this 
assessment is performed. Instead, we add social power as an essential force that inﬂuences the agent’s decision such that 
is coupled to the value assessment but independent of the way in which this assessment is performed. We are therefore 
interested in how this additional force driving the agent’s decision is integrated and conceptualized.
Given the working deﬁnition of social power as a potential force, and before clearly deﬁning the different bases of social 
power used in the model, we must ﬁrst introduce the basic mechanism governing the target’s decision process (see Fig. 3). 
In an inﬂuence situation in which an actor (A) exerts an inﬂuence over a target (T ) regarding a behavior C that A wishes T
to perform, there are only two possible outcomes: T decides to perform C or T decides not to perform C . In the ﬁrst case, 
the inﬂuence interaction is successful; otherwise, it fails.
In a given social power interaction, the agent may identify several social powers to be simultaneously active. Each 
identiﬁed social power (p) represents a single social power originating from a speciﬁc base of social power. The set as a 
whole may contain social powers originating from only one base (e.g., may include several coercions) or may comprise social 
powers arising from several distinct bases [37]. We denote the set of identiﬁed social powers by IdentiﬁedSocialPowers (ISP). 
Each of these powers creates a potential force (PotentialForcep) exerted by the actor on the target, inﬂuencing the target’s 
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considered (see Formula (1)). First are the personal biases (PBT ,p) related to the preferences or inherited traits of the agent 
that affect the associated social power (e.g., a need for aﬃliation [57]); these should be deﬁned for the agent at authoring 
time. The factors of the second type are the beliefs (BeT ,p) that evolve from the agent’s interactions in the environment that 
also affect the different social powers (e.g., a belief regarding another agent’s tendency to provide a certain reward). There 
exist a set of personal biases and another of beliefs that are speciﬁc to each base of social power. The function f combines 
the sets of personal biases and beliefs in different ways depending on the base of social power that is associated with each 
particular social power that has been identiﬁed. As such, f is, in fact, a linear combination of functions that consists of a 
sub-function for each base of social power considered in the model (e.g., fCoercive and fExpert).
p ∈ IdentiﬁedSocialPowers
PotentialForcep(T , A,C) = f p(PBT ,p,BeT ,p) (1)
A social power potential force (PotentialForcep) assumes a value in a positive/negative range, in which positive values 
represent a positive inﬂuence toward performing C and negative ones represent an inﬂuence toward not performing C (as 
a realization of the concept of negative social power [66]). A value of 0 means that, although identiﬁed as a potential 
inﬂuence, the force neither favors nor discourages the performance of C . To determine the actor’s overall inﬂuence on the 
target’s decision resulting from all potential social-power forces, we assume a simple resultant force approach in accordance 
with the working deﬁnitions of social power and inﬂuence (see Section 3.4). As represented in Formula (2), this overall 
inﬂuence force is the sum of all of the individual potential forces in I S P .
InﬂuenceForce(T,A,C) =
∑
p∈ISP
PotentialForcep(T , A,C) (2)
In addition to the inﬂuence resulting from social power, another force also indisputably acts on agent decisions, namely, 
the value of the action to be performed. We can better elucidate this additional force by comparing two situations. First, let 
us consider a situation in which a person asks a friend to temporarily lend him a cellphone. It is reasonable for the friend 
to do so given the friendship relation and the low loss of value he experiences by lending the cellphone temporarily. In 
the second situation, the person now asks his friend to buy him a cellphone. In this case, it is similarly reasonable for the 
friend to refuse given the high loss of value he would experience by buying the cellphone. Generally, value measures the 
usefulness of an agent performing an action as a function of the agent’s motivations and goals.
In this mechanism, we model the value force as ValueForce to represent the agent’s natural disposition to perform ac-
tion C . This propensity is unrelated to any social power bases. In fact, in the absence of the coupled inﬂuence of social 
power, the agent’s decision would be based solely on the propensity represented by ValueForce. ValueForce assumes a value 
in a positive/negative range, in which positive values represent a situation favoring the decision to perform C , negative val-
ues represent a resistance situation favoring the decision not to perform C , and 0 indicates indifference. Note that the way 
in which this value is determined is not our focus because it can be deﬁned in various different ways that are unrelated to 
the key issue of social power.
Finally, we model the agent’s decision to either perform C or not ¬C as a combination of the two major forces identiﬁed: 
the inﬂuence of social power and the value of the action. To model the decision, we assume a simple resultant force 
approach, as represented in Formula (3). The α parameter is used to calibrate the balance between the value force and 
the inﬂuence force, thereby facilitating the adjustment of the weight of each component in each decision. For instance, 
a value of α = 1 would mean that the agent would make its decisions based only on the value force, disregarding any 
social-power-related biases. This balance value can be determined experimentally or can be deﬁned by means of other 
complementary models or frameworks.
ResultantForce(T,A,C) = α ∗ ValueForce(T,C) + (1− α) ∗ InﬂuenceForce(T,A,C)
Decision =
{
Do(T ,C), if ResultantForce(T,A,C) > 0
¬Do(T ,C), if ResultantForce(T,A,C) ≤ 0 (3)
If the value is positive, then the target decides to perform C (Do(T , C)); if not, then the target decides not to perform C
(¬Do(T , C)). Note that this decision formalization accounts for the resistance that an agent can offer to a given prescription 
of behavior from another agent [37]. This is present at two distinct levels. First, if the value is negative, it represents an 
opposing force to the inﬂuence being exerted. Second, each PotentialForcep (originating from any base of social power) may 
be a negative potential force, which is another form of opposition to a decision to perform C . For instance, when a person 
dislikes another, this will be represented by a negative force and inﬂuence arising from the referent social power base.
4.3. Social power dynamics
In the deﬁnition of the agent decision mechanism, we introduced the inﬂuence force derived from social power as a 
combination of all of the diverse social powers that are identiﬁed as active in a given situation, each arising from a speciﬁc 
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social power base. In this section, we describe in detail each base of social power according to French and Raven’s taxonomy 
of social powers [37]. The modeled bases of social power are as follows: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent and expert. 
Note that the descriptions are provided from the perspective of the target of the corresponding inﬂuence interaction, i.e., 
based on the target’s characteristics and perceptions. For each base of social power considered in the model, we introduce a 
conceptualization that enables us to integrate it into the decision mechanism as a function of an agent’s personal character-
istics and beliefs, as generically introduced in Formula (1). Although all bases of social power are clearly deﬁned, the factors 
that should be used to conceptualize them are not always so clearly identiﬁed by French and Raven [37]. To be able to 
create a formalism that can subsequently be used in agent simulations, we therefore invoke concepts that were used in the 
descriptions of the bases of social power and relate them to relevant theoretical background insights into their associated 
relations.
Note that when describing the bases of social power, it is important to consider how their underlying factors vary to 
enable the application of our conceptualizations in continuously evolving dynamic environments. To this end, and despite 
the fact that the dynamics of certain factors (e.g., changes in social group membership) are beyond the scope of this work, 
we also detail several aspects that are directly related to each base of social power (e.g., a belief regarding an agent’s 
tendency to coerce). These descriptions are presented based on a common temporal evolution of a social power interaction, 
as illustrated in Fig. 4, and with a focus on the interaction and post-interaction phases because of their contributions to the 
ecology of social power. A common factor that is used to distinguish the dynamics of each social power is the outcome of 
the interaction phase. There are only two possible outcomes: the success or failure of the inﬂuence interaction.
Additionally, to demonstrate the expressiveness of the presented model, we provide examples of critical incidents involv-
ing each base of social power. Once all bases of social power have been introduced, we also present a situation in which 
most types of social powers are present. Although we considered constructing this example as we described the different 
bases of social power, in the end, we refrained from doing so. The reason for this is that, to our knowledge, it is not common 
for almost all types of social powers to be present at the same time, at least, not in a manner to which the reader could 
easily relate them.
4.3.1. Reward
In an inﬂuence situation, a reward social power exists when the target (T ) recognizes that the actor (A) can execute an 
action (ra) that the target positively values in exchange for the execution of the action that the actor intends the target to 
perform (C ). Rewards are based on resources such as money or social praise. Note that the set of all possible rewarding 
actions that the actor can perform for the target are represented by the set RewardingActionsA .
A reward social power that an actor exerts over a target that inﬂuences the latter to perform an action is a function 
of the value that the target assigns to the rewarding action that the actor can perform (Valuera), the target’s achieve-
ment motivation (AchievementMT ) and the target’s perception of the tendency of the actor to perform the rewarding action 
(RewardingT ,A,ra). This description is succinctly modeled by Formula (4).
∃ra ∈ RewardingActionsA ∧ ra = C
PBT ,Reward = {AchievementMT }
BeT ,Reward = {RewardingT ,A,ra,Valuera}
fReward(PBT ,Reward,BeT ,Reward) = Valuera ∗ AchievementMT ∗ RewardingT ,A,ra
(4)
A reward social power is therefore directly proportional to the value of the rewarding action, the achievement motivation 
of the target and the target’s perception of the rewarding tendency of the actor for that rewarding action. The value of an 
action is a positive/negative variable, where negative values represent negatively valued actions, positive values represent 
positively valued actions, and a value of 0 represents an irrelevant action. The achievement motivation is a probability 
variable, where a value of 0 indicates that the target is not at all achievement motivated and a value of 1 indicates that 
the target is extremely achievement motivated. The rewarding tendency is also a probability variable, where a value of 0
indicates that such a tendency has never been observed and a value of 1 indicates that it has always been observed.
Dynamics. If a reward-based inﬂuence interaction is successful, then a commitment is established between the agents. 
After the interaction phase, the target performs the action that the actor intended the target to perform and then expects 
the actor to execute the rewarding action. Subsequently, the actor performs the rewarding action for the target.
The personal bias related to achievement and the value of the rewarding action vary only with the internal motivations 
and goals of the target. By contrast, the rewarding tendency factor evolves based on the target’s experience with the actor 
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that the actor’s perception of the target’s susceptibility to reward8 decreases. If it is successful, then the commitment9
established between the actor and the target commits the latter to execute the action toward which it was inﬂuenced and 
the actor to execute the expected/promised reward after the target fulﬁlls his/her obligation.
Finally, when the actor provides the expected/promised reward, the target’s perception of the rewarding tendency of 
the actor increases, and the target’s liking of the actor also increases.10 Otherwise, if the reward is not given, the target’s 
perception of the rewarding tendency of the actor decreases.
Examples of critical incidents. Imagine a situation in which a factory manager tells a worker that if he increases production, 
then he will be granted a bonus to his salary. A promise of a higher bonus is expected to exert a stronger reward social 
power. However, if the worker does not believe that the manager rewards employees with bonuses for increases in their 
productivity, then there is no reward social power. Similarly, the strength of the social power varies depending on the 
worker’s achievement motivation. If the worker is very weakly achievement motivated, then the promise of a bonus will 
not have a very strong social power impact, whereas if he is highly achievement motivated, then the social power exerted 
by the promise of a bonus is much stronger.
A less common situation that can also be modeled using this conceptualization is that of a negative reward social power. 
Now imagine that instead of a salary bonus, the manager offers to reward the productivity increase with longer breaks 
during the workday. The intention may be a positive reward, but if the worker has a family and wishes to decrease the 
total amount of time spent at the factory to increase his family time, then this offer becomes a negative reward because it 
increases the total amount of time spent at the factory (work time plus break time). Such situations arise when there is a 
mismatch between the motivations that the actor agent believes the target to have and his/her real motivations.
4.3.2. Coercive
In an inﬂuence situation, a coercive social power exists when a target (T ) recognizes that an actor (A) can execute a 
harmful action (ca) if the action underlying the inﬂuence interaction (C ) is not performed by the target. Coercions are based 
on resources such as money or gossip. Note that the set of all possible harmful actions that the actor can perform against 
the target are represented by the set CoerciveActionsA .
A coercive social power that an actor exerts over a target that inﬂuences the latter to perform an action is a function of 
the value that the target assigns to the coercive action that the actor can perform (Valueca), the target’s achievement motiva-
tion (AchievementMT ) and the target’s perception of the tendency of the actor to perform the coercive action (CoercingT ,A,ca). 
This description is succinctly modeled by Formula (5).
∃ca ∈ CoerciveActionsA ∧ ca = C
PBT ,Coercive = {AchievementMT }
BeT ,Coercive = {CoercingT ,A,ca,Valueca}
fCoercive(PBT ,Coercive,BeT ,Coercive) = −Valueca ∗ AchievementMT ∗ CoercingT ,A,ca
(5)
A coercive social power is therefore inversely proportional to the value of the coercive action and directly proportional to 
the target’s perception of the coercive tendency of the actor for that coercive action. The value of an action is a positive/neg-
ative variable, where negative values represent negatively valued actions, positive values represent positively valued actions, 
and a value of 0 represents an irrelevant action. The achievement motivation is a probability variable, where a value of 0
indicates that the target is not at all achievement motivated and a value of 1 indicates that the target is extremely achieve-
ment motivated. The coercive tendency is also a probability variable, where a value of 0 indicates that such a tendency has 
never been observed and a value of 1 indicates that it has always been observed.
Dynamics. If a coercion-based inﬂuence interaction is successful, then a commitment is established between the agents. 
After the interaction phase, the target performs the action required by the actor and expects the actor’s non-execution of 
the coercive action. If the interaction is unsuccessful, the target expects the actor to execute the coercive action.
The personal bias regarding achievement and the value of the coercive action vary only with the internal preferences, 
motivations and goals of the target. By contrast, the coercive tendency factor evolves based on the target’s experience with 
the actor agent in accordance with the social power dynamics. Regardless of the success or failure of the interaction, an 
immediate effect of the use of a coercive social power is that it decreases the target’s liking of the actor.11 However, if the 
8 This susceptibility, although not part of the quantiﬁcation of the social powers, is important for planning the utilization of social power. During the 
planning of a given social-power-based interaction, this belief regarding susceptibility weights the expected effectiveness of a rewarding strategy for the 
planned future interaction.
9 This agent-speciﬁc commitment to action is an underlying factor of a legitimate social power (see Section 4.3.3).
10 A side effect of using a reward social power [37]. This social relation based on the perception of liking is an underlying factor of a referent social power 
(see Section 4.3.4).
11 A side effect of using a coercive social power [37]. This perception of liking social relation is an underlying factor of a referent social power (see 
Section 4.3.4).
G. Pereira et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 241 (2016) 1–44 17coercion is based on a previously established commitment, then the decrease-of-liking effect is nulliﬁed. If the inﬂuence 
interaction is unsuccessful, another immediate effect is that the actor’s perception of the target’s susceptibility to coercion 
decreases.12 If it is successful, the commitment13 established between the actor and the target commits the latter to execute 
the action toward which he/she was inﬂuenced and the actor to not execute the expected/threatened coercive action after 
the target fulﬁlls his/her obligation. This commitment is also key to differentiating coercive and reward social powers.
There are three major differences between coercive and reward social powers. First, a coercive social power exists on 
the basis of the target’s perception that the actor performs actions that individuals value negatively instead of actions that 
individuals value positively. Second, and based on these different perceptions, a coercive social power establishes a commit-
ment for the actor’s non-execution of an action, whereas a reward social power establishes a commitment for the actor’s 
execution of an action. Third, the effects on the liking social relation occur in different phases14 of the social power interac-
tion and are affected by different conditions (e.g., the negative effects of coercion can be nulliﬁed). Consequently, although 
the two types of social power have very similar mechanisms that are based on resources of the same type (but oppositely 
valued), the distinct dynamics associated with these types of power lead us to model them individually. Additionally, this 
decision also facilitates the utilization of the model in the context of other research using French and Raven’s [37] frame-
work of social power bases. If we were to generalize them under a more abstract concept, we would always be obliged, at 
some point, to make the distinction between these two types of social powers.
Finally, if the actor performs the expected/threatened coercive action, the target’s perception of the coercive tendency of 
the actor increases. However, if the coercive action is avoided, then the target’s perception of the coercive tendency of the 
actor decreases.
Examples of critical incidents. Imagine a situation similar to that used to illustrate reward social powers, but in which the 
factory manager tells the worker that if he does not increase production, then he will be ﬁred. The strength of the social 
power varies with the magnitude of the coercion. However, if the worker does not believe that the manager ﬁres employees 
for failing to increase their productivity, then there is no coercive social power. Similarly, the strength of the social power 
varies depending on the worker’s achievement motivation. If the worker is very weakly achievement motivated (under the 
assumption that he has a motivation to keep his job), then the threat of being ﬁred might not have a high impact, but if he 
is highly achievement motivated, then the social power exerted by the threat of being ﬁred is much stronger. As in the case 
of a reward social power, a negative coercive social power is also possible if there is a mismatch between the motivations 
that the actor agent believes the target to have and his real motivations.
4.3.3. Legitimate
In an inﬂuence situation, a legitimate social power exists when a target (T ) recognizes his/her duty toward an actor (A) 
to execute the action underlying the inﬂuence interaction (C ) based on a social norm (n) established for a group (g) to 
which both agents belong. Note that SocialGroups represents the set of all existing social groups to which the target belongs, 
Membersg represents the set of all members of social group g , and Normsg represents the set of norms of group g . Social 
groups can be created or emerge in societies for several reasons (e.g., common goals) in both formal (e.g., universities) and 
informal (e.g., groups of friends) contexts [36]. Additionally, the processes that govern the group dynamics of membership, 
the deﬁnitions of roles and the creation/adoption of group norms also follow speciﬁc and complex mechanisms. The focus 
is on modeling the social powers that emerge from such social constructs and not on modeling changes to the group, which 
will, of course, affect the social powers acting between group members. For instance, if a member of a group abandons 
his/her membership in that group, then he/she ceases to be under the inﬂuence of the social norms adopted by that 
group. Given the broad scope of possible social norms, our conceptualization is inspired by a basic categorization of norms 
introduced by Raven [68], which builds upon French and Raven’s seminal theory of the bases of social power used to 
support this model [37]:
Position: members of the group are required to obey other members who are in a superior position.
Reciprocity: when a member of the group is beneﬁted, that member should feel obligated to reciprocate.
Equity: members of the group who have been harmed have a right to compensation.
Responsibility: members of the group have some obligation to help other members who are dependent upon them.
Because all of these norms are whole-group norms, in addition to Raven’s categories, we also introduce the action commit-
ment social norm to express speciﬁc interpersonal commitments between agents within a given social group.
A legitimate norm social power (n) is a function of the importance of the relevant social group to the target (Importanceg ), 
the intrinsic dutifulness (DutifulnessMT ) felt by the target toward the social group, the group norm conformity recognized 
by the target (Conf T ,g ) and a norm-related bias (Bias(n)) derived from the agent’s association and experience with the social 
group. This description is modeled by Formula (6). Note that although some variables from the belief set are not directly 
used in Formula (6), they are used to formulate the norm bias, which will be further detailed below. Additionally, note that 
12 Similarly to the reward susceptibility, this susceptibility is important for planning the utilization of coercive social power strategies in future interactions.
13 This agent-speciﬁc commitment to action is an underlying factor of a legitimate social power (see Section 4.3.3).
14 For subsequent interactions in the case of reward and immediately in the case of coercion.
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social norms.
∃g ∈ SocialGroups∧ {A, T } ⊆ Membersg ∧ n ∈ Normsg ∧ NormTypeConditions(n)
PBT ,Legitimate = {DutifulnessMT }
BeT ,Legitimate = {Importanceg, Saliencen,Conf T ,g,
HelpfulActionsg,T ,HarmfulActionsg,A,AllActionsg}
fLegitimate(PBT ,Legitimate,BeT ,Legitimate) = Importanceg ∗ (DutifulnessMT + Conf T ,g) ∗ Bias(n)
(6)
The strength of a legitimate norm social power is therefore directly proportional to all of its components: the impor-
tance of the group, the dutifulness felt by the target, the recognized group norm conformity and the norm bias. The group’s 
importance is a positive variable, where values close to 0 represent a weak group association and higher values represent 
stronger associations with the group. The dutifulness is a probability variable, where a value of 0 indicates that the target 
has no sense of obligation and a value of 1 indicates that the target has a very high sense of obligation. The group norm 
conformity component derives from observations of conformity to group norms by other elements of the group and rep-
resents a dutifulness bias. For instance, in a setting in which members of the group frequently fail to comply with group 
norms, the target will feel less duty-bound to comply with a norm that exerts a legitimate social power. The group norm 
conformity is a probability variable, where a value of 0 indicates that norm conformity has never been observed and a value 
of 1 indicates that it has always been observed.
The most signiﬁcant differences between different legitimate social powers result from the type of norm that supports 
a given social power and the target’s experience with the group. Different types of norms can impose additional conditions 
on Formula (6), which are represented in the norm bias equations below by NormTypeConditions(n). For a position norm 
that establishes an authority relation, the norm bias is modeled according to Formula (7). Because a position norm (n) 
establishes the right of a member with one role (r1) to inﬂuence a member with another role (r2) in the group, for the 
corresponding power to be active, the target (Plays(T , r2)) and the actor (Plays(A, r1)) must be associated with the required 
roles. Rolesg represents the set of all roles in social group g , and Authority(r1, r2) represents the authority relation between 
r1 and r2. Note that a common characteristic of the norm biases associated with all group norms is the salience of the 
norm. The salience is a probability variable, where a value of 0 represents a low relevance of the norm in the group and a 
value of 1 indicates that the norm is very relevant in that group. A higher salience of a group norm in a group results in a 
higher group bias for that norm and, consequently, a stronger overall social power.
NormTypeConditions(n) : ∃r1,r2 ∈ Rolesg ∧ Plays(A, r1) ∧ Plays(T , r2) ∧ Authority(r1, r2)
Bias(n) = Saliencen
(7)
Similarly, for an action commitment norm15 that establishes a commitment between two agents with regard to a given 
behavior, the norm bias is modeled in accordance with Formula (8). Because an action commitment norm (n) establishes 
the right of one agent (A) to inﬂuence another (T ) with regard to a given behavior (C ), for such a power to be active, the 
corresponding commitment (ActionCommitment(T , A, C)) must have been previously established.
NormTypeConditions(n) : ∃ActionCommitment(T , A,C)
Bias(n) = Saliencen
(8)
For reciprocity, equity and responsibility norms there is no speciﬁc role requirements within the group, but the associated 
norm bias does not depend solely on the norm salience. A Reciprocity norm speciﬁes that when an agent in the group has 
been beneﬁted by group actions, that agent should also provide a beneﬁt to other members of the group. The norm bias 
for a reciprocity legitimate social power is modeled in accordance with Formula (9). This social power is affected by the 
group’s history of support (reciprocity bias) toward the target and increases with an increasing percentage of all group 
actions that have been beneﬁcial to the target agent and were not performed by the target him/herself. This reciprocity bias 
is a probability variable, where a value of 0 indicates that the agent has never been beneﬁted by group actions and a value 
of 1 indicates that all group actions have beneﬁted the agent.
NormTypeConditions(n) :∅
Bias(n) = Saliencen ∗
HelpfulActionsg,T
AllActionsg
(9)
An Equity norm speciﬁes that when an agent of the group has been negatively affected by group actions, that agent 
has the right to claim compensation. The norm bias for an equity legitimate social power is modeled in accordance with 
15 Action commitments are interrelated with reward and coercive social powers because in the case of a successful inﬂuence interaction involving a social 
power of the reward or coercive type, a commitment between the participants in the interaction is always generated.
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the percentage of all group actions that have negatively affected the actor agent. This equity bias is a probability variable, 
where a value of 0 indicates that the agent has never been negatively affected by group actions and a value of 1 indicates 
that all group actions have negatively affected the agent.
NormTypeConditions(n) :∅
Bias(n) = Saliencen ∗
HarmfulActionsg,A
AllActionsg
(10)
A Responsibility norm speciﬁes that an agent should help other members of the group who are dependent on that agent. 
When a social power is based on such a norm, as modeled by Formula (11), the corresponding bias is also proportionally 
affected by the degree of dependence DependenceA,T ,C
16 of the actor agent on the target. This bias is also a probability 
variable, where a value of 0 indicates that the actor does not depend at all on the target’s performance of C and a value of 
1 indicates that the actor strongly depends on the target’s performance of C .
NormTypeConditions(n) :∅
Bias(n) = Saliencen ∗ DependenceA,T ,C
(11)
Dynamics. For a legitimate social power, all dynamics occur immediately after the interaction phase regardless of its 
success. Note that although these effects are not our focus, non-immediate effects may occur in the group-level dynamics 
(e.g., re-evaluation of group membership) and in the norm-level dynamics (e.g., re-evaluation of norm saliency) [36].
The group’s importance and norm salience for the target are deﬁned at authoring time. Additionally, the value of the 
dutifulness felt by the target depends on the agent’s intrinsic values, which are also ﬁxed at authoring time. By contrast, the 
group norm conformity depends solely on the agent’s experience and observation of the conformity of other agents with 
the established norms in the group. Therefore, this value varies with successes and failures in situations in which such a 
social power is active. In the case of a successful inﬂuence interaction in which a member of the group complies with an 
established group norm, the norm conformity increases. By contrast, when such an inﬂuence interaction is unsuccessful, the 
perception of the norm conformity decreases because of the failure to comply with the established group norm.
Finally, Reciprocity, Equity and Responsibility norms have additional norm-speciﬁc biases that depend solely on the agent’s 
experience with and observation of other group members. Actions performed by members of the group that are beneﬁcial 
to an agent cause the reciprocity bias of that agent (target) to increase. Similarly, actions performed by members of the 
group that are harmful to an agent cause the equity bias of that agent (actor) to increase. All other actions performed in 
the context of the group indirectly result in a decrease of both of these norm-speciﬁc biases.
Examples of critical incidents. Many social groups, both institutional and informal, can be found throughout human societies. 
However, given the typical focus on institutional perspectives, although this model can express both, the critical incidents 
we will explore relate to the less emphasized but also very important class of informal groups. Imagine a social group of 
the kind that typically emerges in a family. In such a context, it is common for there to be position-related norms, such as 
norms establishing that the younger members of the family should obey the older members. Thus, if a child feels strongly 
duty-bound to comply with this group norm, then the legitimate social power arising from this norm will be very strong. 
For example, this occurs in a situation in which the child is going out with some friends and the parent asks him to be 
home before midnight. If, on the contrary, the child feels little dutifulness, then he might easily refuse to obey the parent’s 
instruction and thus fail to comply with the family group position norm when in the presence of other social or personal 
forces.
In the same setting, if the members of the family group frequently fail to comply with family norms, then the legitimate 
social power of the family group position norm is strongly weakened. For instance, the child might claim that he will not 
obey the parent’s instruction to be home by midnight because the other family members frequently fail to comply with 
other informal norms existing in the family (e.g., requirements to provide for the family). By contrast, if everyone in the 
family group always complies with group norms, then this legitimate social power component exerts a positive force toward 
enhancing the strength of the legitimate social power.
Similar situations can be easily imagined for speciﬁc action commitment norms. For instance, consider a family in which 
it has been established that a speciﬁc child has the task of setting the table for dinner every day. In all such situations, 
the social power can strongly vary with the importance of the group to the target and the salience of the norm within 
the group. If, for example, the target considers his/her association with the family to be very weak (e.g., mostly disregards 
family interactions), then this social power is strongly diminished and may even be nulliﬁed. Similarly, if a norm has little 
salience in the group, then the social power resulting from it is diminished.
16 We do not specify how dependence should be quantiﬁed because this as a complex subject in itself and strongly depends on context. However, in 
general, the degree of dependence should be inversely proportional to the number of alternatives available to the actor regarding the target’s performance 
of C [28].
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establishing that family members should help each other when possible. Hence, a member of the family who is frequently 
helped by other members of the family experiences a stronger legitimate reciprocity social power toward helping other 
members of the family group. Conversely, if no one in the family ever helps a particular family member, then that member 
will feel less (or not at all) compelled, out of reciprocity, to perform an action for another member of the family. Similarly, 
an equity norm may also exist in a family establishing that its members should equally share personal disadvantages among 
the group. If, for instance, the family is on vacation in a foreign city and have visited many attractions, but none that is 
the preference of a particular family member, then that member has a strong legitimate equity social power over the other 
members of the group to inﬂuence them to visit an attraction of his/her choice.
A family group scenario also offers examples of critical incidents involving responsibility norms. For example, imagine a 
situation in which a child who is going out with friends lives far from the place where he has arranged to meet with them 
and public transportation is scarce. When the child asks a parent to drive him to the meeting place, because he has few or 
no alternatives, the parent experiences a strong legitimate responsibility social power inﬂuencing him/her to help the child. 
This occurs because the family upholds a norm that family members should help each other when they are in need (i.e., 
when they have few or no viable alternatives).
4.3.4. Referent
In an inﬂuence situation, a referent social power exists when a target (T ) identiﬁes him/herself with an actor (A) based 
on some personal relation (LikingT ,A ) or status recognition for the actor in a given status category that compels the target, 
based on his/her personal motivations, to comply with the actor. Note that although status has interdependencies with other 
types of social powers (e.g., legitimate), we model it as a referent social power because of its operationalization mechanism 
and its conceptual link to identiﬁcation factors [36].
A referent social power as modeled in this work can be of one of two types: liking or status. A referent liking social 
power that an actor exerts over a target that inﬂuences the latter to perform an action is a function of the strength of 
the liking that the target holds for the actor (LikingT ,A ) and the target’s personal aﬃliative motivation (AﬃliativeMT ). This 
description is succinctly modeled by Formula (12).
PBT ,ReferentLike = {AﬃliativeMT }
BeT ,ReferentLike = {LikingT ,A}
fReferentLike(PBT ,ReferentLike,BeT ,ReferentLike) = LikingT ,A ∗ AﬃliativeMT
(12)
A referent liking social power is therefore directly proportional to the strength of the liking relation held by the target 
agent and to its aﬃliative motivation. The strength of a liking relation is a positive/negative variable, where a negative value 
represents a dislike situation, a positive one represents a like situation, and a value of 0 represents an indifferent relation 
regarding liking. The aﬃliative motivation of the agent is a probability variable, where a value of 0 indicates that the agent 
has no such motivation and a value of 1 indicates that the agent has a very strong aﬃliative motivation.
The other type of referent social power is based on social status, which is deﬁned as a representation of an individual’s 
social prominence and respect [1]. The referent status social power that an actor exerts over a target that inﬂuences the 
latter to perform an action is a function of the actor’s status (StatusT ,A,cat) as recognized by the target, the target’s personal 
status motivation (StatusMT ) and the target’s preference for the speciﬁc category of status held by the actor (Importancecat). 
This description is succinctly modeled by Formula (13). Note that StatusCategories is the set of all status categories that the 
target values.
∃cat ∈ StatusCategories
PBT ,ReferentStatus = {StatusMT }
BeT ,ReferentStatus = {StatusT ,A,cat, Importancecat}
fReferentStatus(PBT ,ReferentStatus,BeT ,ReferentStatus) = StatusT ,A,cat ∗ StatusMT ∗ Importancecat
(13)
A referent status social power is therefore directly proportional to the level of status ascribed by the target to the 
actor, the target’s status motivation and the target’s preference for the relevant status category (e.g., popularity in a group 
of friends). The recognized level of status is a positive/negative variable, where a negative value represents a bad status 
situation (e.g., unpopularity), a positive one represents a good status situation (e.g., popularity), and a value of 0 represents 
an indifferent status standing. The status motivation of the agent is a probability variable, where a value of 0 indicates that 
the agent does not value status relations and a value of 1 indicates that the agent strongly values status relations. Finally, 
the category preference bias is another positive/negative variable, where negative values indicate that the agent negatively 
regards that type of status, positive ones indicate that the agent positively regards that type of status, and a value of 0
indicates that the agent is indifferent to that type of status.
Dynamics. For a referent liking/status social power, all dynamics occur immediately after the interaction phase regardless 
of its success.
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target’s interaction experience with the actor agent. Nonetheless, such relations are generally affected in both valence and 
magnitude by the target’s evaluations of others’ actions with respect to the target’s goals, identity and social relations [10,
22]. Additionally, in accordance with French and Raven’s model [37], a liking relation is also strengthened by reward actions 
(depending on reward execution) and weakened by coercive interactions (regardless of coercion execution). Meanwhile, the 
aﬃliative motivation magnitude of the target agent depends on that agent’s intrinsic value, which is ﬁxed at authoring time 
because it is typically considered to be a stable characteristic.
Regarding a referent status social power, the value of the actor’s status as recognized by the target agent is most strongly 
dependent on the target’s experience of interaction with the actor agent and but is also affected by indirect exchanges 
regarding the actor with other agents. However, as a general indication for the authoring of such social relations in an agent 
system, status values are frequently affected by the performance of speciﬁc actions or the attainment of speciﬁc goals [10]. 
The status motivation magnitude of the target agent depends on that agent’s intrinsic value, which is ﬁxed at authoring time 
because it is typically considered to be a stable characteristic. Finally, the category preference magnitude is also an intrinsic 
value for an agent that is set at authoring time. Although certain types of category preferences [45] are not continuously 
changing, they are not as stable as other characteristics, such as status motivation [57].
Examples of critical incidents. Imagine a situation in which Nick, a friend of Mary, asks her to help him to study for a test. 
Nick’s friendship for Mary is represented by a high liking relation between the two. This relation strengthens the referent 
liking social power imposed on Mary that inﬂuences her to accept the request to help Nick study. If, on the other hand, 
Mary disliked Nick, she would instead be compelled not to help because of that dislike. Regarding the aﬃliative motivation, 
if Mary has a high need for aﬃliation, this means that she strongly values her liking relations and therefore that the referent 
liking social power will be strengthened in either case, whether positive (if, for example, Mary likes Nick) or negative (if 
Mary dislikes Nick). In the case of a null aﬃliation motivation, Mary does not value her aﬃliation relations at all and, 
therefore, no social power will be derived from her liking relation with Nick.
Now imagine another situation in which Jane, a popular member of a school class, asks Carl, who is an unpopular 
classmate, to lend her some money. The status category that is relevant to this example is popularity. If Carl recognizes 
Jane’s popularity status and has a high regard for popularity status, then the status-based referent social power that is 
active will be very effective. However, if Carl has little regard for status in general or for popularity status speciﬁcally, this 
will result in a weak referent status social power inﬂuencing him toward lending Jane money. Alternatively, if Carl does not 
recognize Jane’s high popularity status, then even if he has a high regard for status and values popularity very much, the 
status referent social power inﬂuencing him toward lending the money will again be very low.
4.3.5. Expert
In an inﬂuence situation, an expert social power exists when a target (T ) maintains a trust relationship17 with an actor 
(A) and simultaneously recognizes that the actor has a superior skill (s) associated with the action under inﬂuence.
An expert social power that an actor exerts over a target that inﬂuences the latter to perform an action is a function of 
the importance of the skill associated with that action (Importances,C ), the trust that the target agent holds for the actor 
agent (TrustT ,A ) and the target’s perception of the skill difference between the actor and the target (LevelDA,T ,s) regarding 
the skill associated with the action. This description is modeled by Formula (14). Note that Skills represents the set of all 
known skills.
∃s ∈ Skills
PBT ,Expert = {}
BeT ,Expert = {Importances,C , LevelA,s, LevelT ,s,TrustT,A,MaxSkillLevels}
LevelDA,T ,s = LevelA,s − LevelT ,s
MaxSkillLevels
ExpertB =
{
TrustT,A ∗ LevelDA,T,s, if TrustT,A = 0∧ LevelDA,T ,s > 0
0, otherwise
fExpert(PBT ,Expert,BeT ,Expert) = Importances,C ∗ ExpertB
(14)
The strength of an expert social power is therefore directly proportional to the importance of the associated skill, the 
magnitude of the target’s trust relationship with the actor and the recognized skill difference between the actor and the 
target. The skill importance speciﬁes the relevance of the current skill to the action under inﬂuence and is a positive 
variable, where values close to 0 represent a skill that is very weakly associated with C and higher values indicate that the 
skill is more strongly associated with C . The trust that the target holds for the actor depends on the target’s experience with 
the actor and is a positive/negative variable, where positive values indicate that the target trusts the actor, negative values 
indicate that the target distrusts the actor, and a value of 0 indicates that there is no trust relationship. The perceived skill 
17 In this deﬁnition, we use a conceptualization of trust from a reliance perspective [31].
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the actor agent is perceived as unskillful with regard to the associated skill and a larger magnitude of the variable indicates 
a greater level of skill on the part of the actor agent. The quantity MaxSkillLevels identiﬁes the maximum skill level known 
to the target agent.
Dynamics. For an expert social power, all dynamics occur immediately after the interaction phase regardless of its success.
The skill importance is a value that is set at authoring time because it represents a prototypical and stable percep-
tion. A trust relationship depends on the experience of the target agent with the actor agent with respect to actions that 
increase/decrease trust according to speciﬁc dynamics [31]. Regarding the perceived skill, changes occur when actions asso-
ciated with learning (e.g., when someone reads a book about programming) or demonstrations of skill (e.g., when someone 
programs something very diﬃcult and others recognize that person’s skill) are performed [10].
Examples of critical incidents. A typical situation in which an expert social power may be observed is when a physician 
instructs a patient to follow a given medical prescription. In this situation, Bart, the patient, recognizes that medical skills are 
important for prescribing an appropriate medicine. Even if, for instance, Bart knows that John (the physician) has excellent 
musical skills, this knowledge exerts no expert social power in this interaction because there is no association between 
musical skills and effective medical prescriptions.
If Bart maintains a positive trust relationship with John and Bart recognizes that John is a very good doctor (and thus 
has very good medical skills), then John’s expert social power is increased. By contrast, if Bart knows that John has, for 
instance, not yet graduated with his medical degree, then he might be regarded as an unskillful doctor, causing the expert 
social power to be strongly diminished.
Now, imagine a situation in which Bart has been warned that John tends to favor certain pharmaceutical companies in 
his prescriptions, regardless of the best course of treatment (e.g., treatments that minimize secondary effects). Although 
John is undoubtedly more skillful than Bart in medicine, the fact that he is using those skills not for Bart’s beneﬁt but for 
his own beneﬁt makes John unreliable and, thus, a source of negative expert social power for Bart. Note that in this case, 
it is not the main underlying factor of the expert social power (skill) that is responsible for the negative change in social 
power but rather the trust factor, which directly impacts the main factor.
4.4. Putting it all together: a comprehensive example
Consider a situation in which a boy is going out with his friends, but before leaving home, he is instructed by his father 
to be home before midnight. At a certain point after leaving home and before midnight, he will be faced with the decision 
to either do as told by his father or defy his father’s wishes. What are the forces in play affecting the boy’s decision? How 
do we apply our model?
4.4.1. Initial situation
The agents in this scenario are A = father and T = boy, and the action upon which the boy will have to decide is 
C = ReturnOnTime. Although there can be many established social norms in a Family group, for this example, we will 
consider only one (informal) position social norm that is frequently adopted in families: children should always obey their 
parents (ObeyParents). Based on this, we have the father assuming the parent role and the boy assuming the role of the child. 
Regarding liking relations, we assume that the boy likes his father. Concerning actions, we consider the father’s capability 
to WithdrawAllowance, GroundBoy and AllowReturnLate. The boy’s action that is relevant to this example is his capability to 
ReturnOnTime. Finally, the decision that is the focus of this example is that made by the boy, in which he must choose to 
either Do(boy, ReturnOnTime) or ¬Do(boy, ReturnOnTime).
4.4.2. Modeling the boy’s decision
Following the introduced social power decision mechanism (see Section 4.2) and social power dynamics (see Section 4.3), 
the boy begins by identifying the social powers that are active in his current situation. As a result, the boy identiﬁes the 
following potential social-power forces:
1. PotentialForcecoe1 = fCoercive({AchievementMboy}, {Coercingboy,father,WithdrawAllowance})
2. PotentialForcecoe2 = fCoercive({AchievementMboy}, {Coercingboy,father,GroundBoy})
3. PotentialForcerew1 = fReward({AchievementMboy}, {Rewardingboy,father,AllowReturnLate})
4. PotentialForceleg1 = fLegitimate({DutifulnessMboy}, {ImportanceFamily, SalienceObeyParents, Conf boy,Family})
5. PotentialForceref1 = fReferentLike({AﬃliativeMboy}, {Likingboy,father})
The coercive powers represent the father’s ability to punish the boy by withdrawing his allowance (1) or grounding him 
(2) from future opportunities to go out with his friends. Concerning rewards, the father can allow the boy to stay out longer 
(3) the next time if he behaves properly this time. The legitimate power (4) represents the father’s right to inﬂuence the 
boy regarding ReturnOnTime arising from the fact that the boy plays the role of the child and the father plays that of the 
parent. The referent power (5) is based on the son–father relationship between the two agents. No expert power exerts any 
force because there is no skill that is relevant to this situation.
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Example values for the case of a well-behaved child.
Characteristic Value
AchievementMboy 0.6
DutifulnessMboy 0.7
AﬃliativeMboy 0.8
ValueAllowReturnLate 50
Rewardingboy,father,AllowReturnLate 0.4
ValueWithdrawAllowance −150
Coercingboy,father,WithdrawAllowance 0.1
Characteristic Value
ValueGroundBoy −200
Coercingboy,father,GroundBoy 0.3
ImportanceFamily 100
SalienceObeyParents 0.9
Conf boy,Family 0.8
Likingboy,father 100
ValueForce(boy,ReturnOnTime) −100
The boy’s decision between Do(boy, ReturnOnTime) and ¬Do(boy, ReturnOnTime) thus depends only on the values of the 
forces that are active in this situation. From the perspective of what occurs in real life, both cases are believable given the 
appropriate personal characteristics, relationships and beliefs. We will present both cases accordingly.
4.4.3. Case 1: a well-behaved child
If we assume a well-behaved son, then all of the social-power forces work toward C , and although the value to the 
boy of the action of returning on time offers resistance to this decision, he will return home before midnight. To illustrate 
this case, consider the values given in Table 2. Regarding personal characteristics, we assume that the boy is moderately 
achievement motivated, strongly dutiful and strongly aﬃliation motivated. Additionally, the boy considers the father to 
have a low tendency to withdraw his allowance and moderate tendencies to ground him and allow him to return late. He 
positively values the father’s capability to allow him to return later at another time. By contrast, he very negatively values 
the father’s capabilities to withdraw his allowance and ground him. Concerning his group aﬃnity, we assume that the boy
values his Family group and that within the family, it is very important to uphold the existing position social norm. In this 
context, the boy perceives the Family group to have a high norm conformity. The liking relationship that the boy has with 
his father is strong. Finally, the boy’s resistance to returning on time is also strong.
Note that the values assigned to each characteristic are mapped in accordance with the described situation and with 
consideration for the associated variable type for each assignment. For instance, “low tendency to withdraw allowance” is 
mapped to a probability-like variable with a value of 0.1, whereas “moderate tendencies to ground and to allow late return” 
are mapped to probability-like variables with values of 0.3 and 0.4, respectively. In this way, we maintain the meaning 
conveyed in the example but express it in a quantitative form that can be used in the model. Other types of parameters 
that are used are characterized as either positive (e.g., the importance of the family social group) or positive/negative (e.g., 
the boy’s value evaluation of having his allowance withdrawn). These types of parameters are not restricted by the model 
in terms of upper/lower bounds, although these bounds should be considered when authoring the scenario. The most 
important precaution to consider is that the numerical values must maintain relative values between them that reﬂect the 
intended semantic differences depicted in the scenario. For example, considering the value of −150 assigned to the boy’s 
evaluation of his allowance being withdrawn by his father, which is negative because of the loss of resources it can cause; 
however, the value associated with being grounded, −200, is even more negative because this action would very strongly 
restrict the boy. However, we can easily imagine that neither of these situations is valued nearly as negatively as becoming 
severely injured (e.g., −900).
Based on Table 2, we can calculate the actual values of the identiﬁed potential social-power forces:
PotentialForcerew1 = 50 ∗ 0.6 ∗ 0.4 = 12
PotentialForcecoe1 = −(−150) ∗ 0.6 ∗ 0.1 = 9
PotentialForcecoe2 = −(−200) ∗ 0.6 ∗ 0.3 = 36
PotentialForceleg1 = 100 ∗ (0.7+ 0.8) ∗ 0.9 = 135
PotentialForceref1 = 100 ∗ 0.8 = 80
Now, according to deﬁnition (2), it is possible to calculate the overall social-power force:
InﬂuenceForce(boy, father,ReturnOnTime) =
= PotentialForcerew1 + PotentialForcecoe1 + PotentialForcecoe2 + PotentialForceleg1 + PotentialForceref1 =
= 12+ 9+ 36+ 135+ 80
= 272
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the decision of the boy agent according to (3). For this example, we assume a balance between the value and inﬂuence 
forces of α = 0.5. Therefore, the resultant force value is as follows:
ResultantForce(boy, father,ReturnOnTime) = 0.5 ∗ −100+ (1− 0.5) ∗ 272 = 86
Based on the value of the resultant force and the condition ResultantForce(boy, father,ReturnOnTime) > 0 from deﬁni-
tion (3), the boy agent decides on Do(boy,ReturnOnTime), meaning that he will return home on time, before midnight.
4.4.4. Case 2: disobedience in a well-behaved child
Now imagine that the boy is having more fun than he has ever had before. In this case, the situation might arise in which 
a well-behaved son nevertheless disobeys his father’s command because the value force surpasses the social-power-based 
inﬂuence force exerted by his father. This means that the evaluation of the situation changes drastically. To illustrate this 
scenario, suppose that the value of ValueForce(T , C) in Table 2 changes from −100 to −300, while all other values remain 
the same. Because the underlying factors associated with the social power calculation do not change, the resultant force 
including the impact of this change is as follows:
ResultantForce(boy, father,ReturnOnTime) = 0.5 ∗ −300+ (1− 0.5) ∗ 272 = −14
Based on the value of the resultant force and the condition ResultantForce(boy, father,ReturnOnTime) ≤ 0 from deﬁni-
tion (3), the boy agent decides on ¬Do(boy, ReturnOnTime), meaning that he will not return home on time and will stay out 
late.
4.4.5. Other complex cases
An additional interesting case is that of a rebellious son, in which the legitimate component of the social-power force 
would exert a negative inﬂuence because the command issued by the father actually exerts a power that works against 
ReturnOnTime. In this case, the rebellious son is much more likely to stay out with his friends ¬Do(boy, ReturnOnTime)
even in the ﬁrst case. Note that this does not mean that he “does not like” his father; a son might like his father and 
simultaneously exhibit rebellious behavior. Our model enables the simulation of such complex situations.
5. Integrating SAPIENT with typical agent processes
To develop agent systems implementing the model described above, we must understand the links between typical agent 
processes and the introduced social power model. From a computational perspective, our main inspiration for the creation 
of an agent framework to support the SAPIENT model is the BDI architecture [8,65]. Based on this architecture, our starting 
point is a typical agent with corresponding sets of Beliefs (knowledge about itself, others and the environment), Desires 
(goals to pursue) and Intentions (actions or plans to which the agent is committed). The SAPIENT model is then integrated 
into the deliberative process of the agent, from the generation of options to the actual selection of an option and belief 
updates. In this section, we present a cognitive agent architecture, focusing on the links between these typical BDI agent 
structures and social-power-related concepts.
To create an agent architecture that can endow agents with social power awareness and the ability to generate behaviors 
based on plans while incorporating social power strategies, our main inspiration is Raven’s Power/Interaction Model [66]. 
The advantage of using this model is that it was speciﬁcally created to explore the links between the bases of social power 
introduced by French and Raven [37] (and used in the SAPIENT model) and their operationalization in inﬂuence interactions. 
In a social power interaction, there are two main interaction perspectives, each requiring a speciﬁc cognitive process. One 
is the perspective of the inﬂuencing or actor agent (see Fig. 5), and the other is the perspective of the inﬂuenced or target 
agent (see Fig. 6). Although the descriptions of the SAPIENT model given above were fundamentally focused on the target 
of the interaction, in this section, we describe agents that can be either targets or actors.
5.1. Perspective of the actor agent
The actor agent’s cognitive process (see Fig. 5) begins with the evaluation of its motivations (needs or goals). When an 
agent has a motivation to inﬂuence another (e.g., needs another to perform some action), he/she evaluates the bases of social 
power that are relevant for inﬂuencing that other agent. Based on this initial analysis, the agent decides whether a strategic 
interaction is required to emphasize his/her social power and improve the chances of a successful inﬂuence interaction.18
If the agent decides to use a social power strategy, he/she assesses which strategies he/she can employ given the available 
bases of social power. During the “Choice of Inﬂuence Mode” cognitive stage, the agent then chooses his/her preferred 
power strategy (if any) and attempts to exert his/her social power by communicating its inﬂuence to the target agent. When 
refraining from using a social power strategy the communication of the inﬂuence does not in any way emphasize any social 
power. After a reply from the interaction target, the actor assesses the effects resulting from the inﬂuence interaction (e.g., 
18 Power strategies are related to “Preparatory Devices” in the Power/Interaction Model [66].
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Fig. 6. The target agent’s cognitive process in a social power interaction episode.
an increase or decrease in interpersonal attraction [37]) and adjusts the social power structures in his/her Knowledge Base 
accordingly.
In a social-power-based interaction, one agent can inﬂuence another in two different ways. First, the agent might simply 
ask another agent to do something. The second possibility is to ask for that same thing while simultaneously emphasizing a 
relevant social power base, thereby increasing the magnitude of the exerted power. These modality considerations are called 
social power strategies and are used to emphasize one or several bases of social power. Power strategies are diverse [35]
and involve various types of considerations (e.g., the highlighting of a capability for a possible coercive action). Finally, it is 
important to remark that the actor can also passively inﬂuence the target without being aware of it and, therefore, without 
engaging in the cognitive process described above. This situation occurs when the actor is not aware of the inﬂuence that 
it is exerting on the target agent. For instance, imagine a police oﬃcer standing on a sidewalk during a work break, thereby 
inadvertently dissuading illegal parking.
5.2. Perspective of the target agent
The target agent’s cognitive process (see Fig. 6) begins with an analysis of the agent’s motivations and past interactions 
with other agents. If no inﬂuence interaction is anticipated but one occurs nonetheless, then the agent begins by assessing 
the bases of social power identiﬁed as relevant to that interaction. Based on that assessment, the agent decides to either 
accept or reject the inﬂuence interaction. Next, similarly to the actor agent, the target will then assess the effect resulting 
from the interaction and adjust his/her Knowledge Base accordingly. In the case in which the agent anticipated the inﬂuence 
interaction, he/she plans and prepares a reaction to the anticipated inﬂuence interaction. The ﬁrst step is the assessment of 
the relevant social power bases for the interaction. Next, the agent decides whether he/she requires19 a strategy to resist 
the anticipated inﬂuence interaction. At this stage, the agent has planned a reaction to the anticipated inﬂuence interaction, 
and if and when that interaction actually occurs, the agent reacts to it with the planned reaction. Following the reaction, 
the agent assesses the effects and updates his/her Knowledge Base accordingly.
5.3. Cognitive agent architecture
To operationalize the presented cognitive processes, we developed an agent architecture for agents that are socially in-
telligent with regard to social power. The developed architecture, presented in Fig. 7, highlights the relations of the typical 
19 There are situations in which resistance is not desired, for instance, if the agent would beneﬁt from accepting the inﬂuence interaction.
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agent processes with three core social power processes that are identiﬁed as fundamental for agents participating in social 
power interaction episodes. Note the main sequence of cognitive processes for both actor and target agents (without antici-
pation), which maps the previously presented ﬂuxograms to the developed architecture. The Knowledge Base is graphically 
represented as a fully connected attribute because it is a fundamental component upon which all other processes depend, 
and as such, although it is connected to all other processes, these connections are not explicitly represented for clarity of 
presentation.
Considering the underlying inspiration provided by the typical BDI architecture [8,65], in the following sections, several 
components are discussed in further detail, with a focus on their relations to social power processes. The key implications 
of extending such an architecture to include social power processes are related to the structure of the agent’s beliefs and 
individual characteristics and how the agent’s deliberative process is affected. As such, several processes, although important 
for a fully operational agent, will not be discussed in detail because they require no signiﬁcant changes regarding their 
function. This is the case for the following processes: Assessment of Signals (sensing of signals from the environment and 
other agents), Goal-Based Planning (typical planning process for an agent’s action) and Action Selection (coordination of 
agent actuation on the environment).
5.3.1. Beliefs, motivations and preferences
Some of the key changes that social power processes entail in a typical agent architecture are related to the agent’s belief 
structure and the attributes that characterize the agent’s individual behavior. These are used in the deliberative processes to 
support social-power-related analysis and impact the selection among different options. The components focused on in this 
section are the Knowledge Base, Motivations and Power Preferences.
An agent’s Knowledge Base is, effectively, the agent’s internal source of information, which is used and updated by 
all other agent processes. The Knowledge Base structure, presented in Fig. 8, highlights the different types of knowledge 
that have an impact on social-power-related agent processes. The “General Beliefs” attribute includes all knowledge that 
is necessary to make an agent aware of its environment (e.g., the positions of objects). The “Models of Others” attribute 
represents an agent’s beliefs regarding other agents, i.e., the agent models other agents as similar cognitive agents. A model 
of another agent is built using information collected from direct interactions with that agent and from observations of 
interactions between the modeled agent and others. Additionally, in the absence of information regarding another agent’s 
motivation characteristics, these are projected from the agent’s own personal characteristics (a form of human projection 
bias [61]). By modeling other agents in this manner, the agent can reason about situations from others’ perspectives and 
integrate that information into its own analysis and decision processes (using the Behavior Analysis process). The “Goals” 
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attribute includes the agent’s mental representations of desired world states. These range from non-social goals (e.g., move 
a chair) to social goals (e.g., harm another agent). The “Intentions” attribute represents the actions that the agent has 
committed to perform, e.g., actions to complete a particular plan. The “Power Strategies” attribute represents the agent’s 
known strategies for using various bases of social power. These have speciﬁc constraints, preference biases and modes of 
usage [34,36]. The “Power Effects” attribute represents the agent’s knowledge about the effects that the usage of various 
social power bases and strategies can have on its beliefs (e.g., an increase/decrease in a liking relation).
Next, in our social power model, a group of beliefs that underlie the bases of social power is deﬁned. The “Action Capa-
bilities” attribute represents the actions that an agent can perform (e.g., provide a resource) and that underlie coercive and 
reward bases of social power. The “Social Norms” attribute represents all types of internalized values that support legitimate 
bases of social power, modeled as either formal or informal social norms [12]. The “Relations” attribute registers the differ-
ent types of social relations (i.e., liking and status) that an agent maintains with others and serves as the basis of referent 
social powers. Finally, the “Skills” attribute represents the skillfulness of the agent, which is fundamental for determining 
the expert social powers associated with actions requiring speciﬁc skills to be performed effectively. For instance, giving 
an object to someone is a typical action that does not require any expertise; by contrast, the programming of a computer 
application can only be performed by a person with computer programming skills.
Another component that impacts the agent’s perceptions of social power is the agent’s Motivations. The agent’s motiva-
tional structure is a combination of social-power-relevant factors and scenario-relevant factors. Scenario-speciﬁc motivation 
factors depend on the implemented setting and must be speciﬁed when creating the scenario. For the social-power-relevant 
factors, the Power/Interaction Model [66] provides the general motivational framework by identifying social-power-speciﬁc 
motivations such as goals and the satisfaction of internal needs. However, this model does not clarify which internal needs 
can be used to characterize an agent.
For this purpose, we use McClelland’s Human Motivation theory [57] because of its clear intersection with our concep-
tualization of social power. Social-power-speciﬁc motivations have three core dimensions. The ﬁrst is achievement and is 
related to the need to accomplish goals, which directly impacts reward and coercive social powers as well as the value 
assessment process of the agent. The second is aﬃliation and is related to the need to nurture and uphold social relations, 
which is directly related to referent liking social powers. The third motivation dimension is power and is related to the 
need for status and recognition; therefore, this dimension is used to model the personal status motivation of the agent 
relevant to referent status social powers. Even with the invocation of McClelland’s Human Motivation theory, support for 
one intrinsic agent motivation is still lacking: the dutifulness of the agent. To address this lack, we have found that we can 
model dutifulness as a combination of the personality traits of agreeableness and conscientiousness [36] from the ﬁve-factor 
model [19]. All these factors map the personal biases described in the developed social power model.
The ﬁnal attribute that is intimately related to the individual behavior of an agent is the agent’s Power Preferences. 
Although in general, individual preferences inﬂuence most actions to some extent, in considering this attribute, we model 
only those preferences that are related to the agent’s utilization (from the actor’s perspective) of social power (e.g., prefer-
ences regarding the use of either coercive or referent social power bases). Again, social psychology offers valuable insights 
into the dimensions that can be used to model these individual preferences. One of the factors that has been speciﬁcally 
correlated with the utilization of different bases of social power is personality [34,36]. In modeling this attribute, we map 
an agent’s personality characteristics to biases toward using strategies relying on particular social power bases in their social 
interactions according to the ﬁndings of Karkoulian et al. [44]. Their study was based on the ﬁve-factor model [19] and ad-
dressed French and Raven’s [37] bases of social power, and as such, their ﬁndings can be directly mapped to the preference 
mechanism in the developed model.
5.3.2. Core social power processes
To create an agent that is capable of sensing, deliberating and taking action based on social power, we must understand 
how social power is manipulated. This occurs at three different levels, each of which is represented in the SAPIENT archi-
tecture as a core social power process. This section focuses on examining these core processes and their links with other 
agent components.
The ﬁrst core social power process is the Power Situational Analysis process, the primary purpose of which is to identify 
and quantify the social-power forces that are relevant to a given (possible or anticipated) inﬂuence interaction. One fun-
damental force directing the agent’s behavior is the value of the action underlying the inﬂuence interaction. To determine 
this value and use it in this assessment, the agent uses the “Value Assessment” process, which conceptualizes the agent’s 
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tivations and goals. At a basic level, this assessment measures the value of the action for the agent based on concepts similar 
to those of utility in the sense that it evaluates the usefulness of performing the action. However, the focus of the Power 
Situational Analysis process is the potential social-power forces that can either oppose or reinforce the value of the action. 
To assess these forces, the agent must detect the social powers modeled in Section 4 and identify which social powers are 
active in the current interaction context. For instance, for a reward social power to be active, there must be a rewarding 
tendency associated with the action underlying the inﬂuence attempt. The quantiﬁcation of social powers is thus a function 
of all these factors, in accordance with the mechanism introduced in Section 4.2. The ﬁnal output of this process is the set 
of all social powers identiﬁed as relevant to a given interaction and the resultant inﬂuence force that arises from them with 
regard to an inﬂuence interaction. For the pseudocode of this cognitive process, see Algorithm 1 in Appendix A.
The second core social power process is the Power Effect Assessment process; its main purpose is to identify the effects 
(or outcomes) of a social power interaction. Some inspiration for the modeling of these effects comes from French and 
Raven [37]. In their presentation of the bases of social power, they discuss the effect of the increase in referent social 
power that occurs when a reward social power is used and its corresponding decrease when coercion is used. Interestingly, 
these dynamics can be altered when these social powers are used in combination with legitimate social power. Consider 
a situation in which a given base for legitimate social power (e.g., a contract or a norm) between two agents may deﬁne 
the legitimacy of a given reward or coercion. Rewards or punishments with different legitimacies will have different effects 
on the target agent. In legitimate coercion (e.g., the issuance of a ﬁne for running a red light), the negative effect of using 
coercion is attenuated, whereas in the case of a legitimate reward (e.g., the provision of a bonus for increased productivity), 
there is no difference.
Although French and Raven associate certain social power effects with speciﬁc bases of social power, a general social 
power dynamics mechanism relating social power interactions with their effects is not discussed. To address this lack of 
a generic mechanism, which inherently strongly limits the modeling of dynamics to scenario-speciﬁc authored effects, we 
introduce a claim/conferral mechanism inspired by Kemper’s Status-Power Theory [46]. This mechanism provides a generic 
mechanism for social power effects that can be applied to the diverse constituents of Raven’s social power conceptualization. 
For instance, with regard to an expert social power, if a given actor uses an expertise strategy (e.g., stating “You should do 
this because I have more expertise on this topic”), that actor is making a claim of his higher expert social power. If the 
target accepts this claim, then the target is conferring a higher expert social power (compared with the perception of that 
power before the interaction) to the actor, and the claim becomes permanent. If the claim is rejected, this means that 
the target confers less social power than the actor expected. Similarly, even in the context of a non-strategic interaction 
(a simple request to perform a given task without emphasis on any factor related to a social power base), if the target 
recognizes the higher expert social power of the actor (confers a higher expert social power to the actor), then the actor’s 
claim is simply met. In the case of a refusal, the target confers a lower expertise to the actor. This reasoning can be applied 
to several of the social power bases introduced by French and Raven. The Power Effect Assessment process identiﬁes the 
changes in social-power-related beliefs that result from a given interaction. For the pseudocode of this cognitive process, 
see Algorithm 7 in Appendix A.
The last core social power process is the Power Interaction Planning process, and its purpose is to perform online 
planning for social-power-based interactions. It enables the agent to reason about possible inﬂuence situations and select 
its best option for inﬂuencing other agents by integrating all of its knowledge about social powers and their effects as well 
as its own social power utilization preferences.
The basic information needed for planning an interaction is obtained from the “Power Situational Analysis” process 
through an assessment of the potential social-power forces that are active in a given context (using the mental model of 
the target). This information is then used in the “Power Effect Assessment” process to identify the anticipated changes in 
social-power-related beliefs and analyze their values for the agent. For example, the use of a threat, which emphasizes 
a coercive base of social power, will unquestionably cause its target to dislike the agent using it, thereby diminishing 
that agent’s referent social power over the target. Once the potential social-power forces and anticipated effects have been 
identiﬁed, the agent must still compare and choose among the different interaction possibilities. It is at this stage of planning 
that the agent’s “Power Preferences” attribute biases the agent’s choice of strategy by increasing the values of certain 
interaction possibilities in accordance with personality-related biases [44]. Once these biases are applied to all interaction 
possibilities, the agent has a range of options from which to choose. For the ﬁnal decision of which option to choose, the 
agent attributes a probability to each option based on the difference between the value of the current option and that of 
the lowest valued option. Options with higher differences in value have a higher probability to be chosen. This mechanism 
enables us to model some amount of variation in people’s behavior, although this behavior is very strongly inﬂuenced by 
the performed planning process.
A fundamental component of this planning mechanism is the behavioral analysis that is applied to predict how another 
agent will regard and react to a possible interaction as well as its effects from that agent’s perspective (by applying second-
order Theory of Mind reasoning [54]). To perform such an analysis, the agent in the role of the actor uses its mental model 
of the other (target) agent and simulates the target’s cognitive process to attempt to predict its social power and value 
assessments and, consequently, its decision.
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of an expert social power, there are strategies for emphasizing the importance of the skill in the given situation, the target’s 
trust in the actor and the difference in skill level between the target and actor. Following the same approach, we created 
social power strategies for all factors used in the formalization of the different bases of social power.
In summary, in the Power Interaction Planning process, the actor agent decides which is the best course of action to 
follow in order to inﬂuence another agent. The selected interaction mode may abstain from the use of a social power 
strategy or may use a speciﬁc social power strategy that emphasizes a given base of social power. To make this decision, 
the agent performs a situational social power analysis and considers its own agent-speciﬁc preferences for strategies relying 
on different bases of social power as well as their effects upon itself and the target of the inﬂuence interaction. For the 
pseudocode of this cognitive process, see Algorithm 10 in Appendix A.
5.4. Using the SAPIENT framework in different contexts
To operationalize the developed cognitive architecture, we implemented it in the SAPIENT framework. It was developed 
as a generic C# library targeting .NET 3.5 to maximize compatibility with Unity™, which is frequently used to build intel-
ligent agent systems. The framework is accompanied by a set of tests that enabled us to verify the correct implementation 
of the social power mechanisms. Additionally, we built an authoring tool to allow easy parameterization of both the envi-
ronment and the agents created with the framework. This authoring tool signiﬁcantly facilitated the processes of testing the 
framework and implementing and reﬁning scenarios. The developed framework, testing procedures and authoring tool are 
available to the community.21
The SAPIENT framework (and accompanying authoring tool) provides a theoretically supported and clearly structured 
approach for authoring social forces as drivers of agent/character behavior that is independent of context. To create SAPI-
ENT agents for a given context, a user speciﬁes the characteristics that parameterize their cognitive processes and will 
consequently generate their behaviors. The characteristics to be speciﬁed are the agents’ mental representations of their 
environment (e.g., existing objects and their properties), their individual characteristics (e.g., capabilities, personality, and 
motivations) and their social reality (e.g., liking/status relationships and social groups). Once these characteristics have been 
authored and the corresponding conﬁguration ﬁle has been generated,22 it is used by the SAPIENT framework to create the 
agents’ minds for any subsequent simulation (discrete or continuous). The link between the simulation environment and the 
agents’ minds is established through a set of pre-deﬁned signals that can be communicated between the framework and 
the simulation environment.
The agent framework is independent of context, environmental discreteness and simulation representation (e.g., 3D envi-
ronment or text-based). Moreover, if there are any pre-existing simulation-logic- or visual-representation-dependent factors 
that have not been represented in the framework, it is possible to adapt it to handle these speciﬁc cases. This is achieved 
by adding new signals to enable the framework to properly link with an existing environment. It is also possible (using a 
plug-in architecture) to extend the native signal-handling processes (that handle social-power-related signals) with scenario-
speciﬁc signal handlers for any possible signal. Similarly, it is also possible to extend the agent’s decision processes with 
scenario-speciﬁc logic.
6. Case study: Social Theatre
To explore the potential of the developed cognitive architecture, we implemented the presented social power model in a 
game to perform a pilot user study evaluation. The study focused on assessing the model’s ability to create agents that are 
perceived to have social power awareness and on the interaction experience that such agents provide for users.
6.1. Scenario description
Social Theatre is a virtual environment in which a user plays the role of the director of a theatre company (see Fig. 9). The 
company consists of four actor agents that were created using the SAPIENT framework to integrate social power cognitive 
processes into the agents’ decisions. In addition to conceptualizing and maintaining a social relation with the user, each 
actor agent has a speciﬁc preference regarding the role that actor wishes to perform in a given play. In this environment, we 
created a human–agent interaction setting in which the agents are affected by the social powers associated with inﬂuence 
interactions with the user. The game takes the user through sequences of rehearsal/performance cycles, each representing 
a different play. A play is characterized by a speciﬁc set of available roles that determines the diﬃculty of the assignments 
to be made by the user. In an easy situation, the available roles perfectly match the actors’ preferences. In a more diﬃcult 
20 Power strategies are related to “Preparatory Devices” in the Power/Interaction Model [66].
21 http :/ /gaips .inesc-id .pt /sapient.
22 All this is done through a speciﬁcally tailored authoring tool that has a graphical user interface to facilitate interaction and to more easily organize 
and display the concepts to be authored. Furthermore, the tool offers built-in help information and dependency handling/alerts. For instance, if the user 
eliminates a type of agent motivation and has also previously speciﬁed a goal to modify that motivation, the user is asked if he/she really wishes to 
eliminate the motivation because doing so will also eliminate all agents’ goals that depend on it.
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situation, only one actor preference can be satisﬁed by the available roles, and thus, the likelihood of several actors rejecting 
their assigned roles is increased. Note that each different role has an associated “time on stage”. As such, beyond the actor’s 
speciﬁc role preferences, the value of any role increases with the associated “time on stage”.
In each rehearsal, the user must direct the agents by assigning them roles from among the set of available roles for the 
current play while simultaneously attempting to inﬂuence the agents to accept these roles. If an agent does not accept the 
assigned role, then that agent leaves the rehearsal and will not participate in the play, thereby diminishing its quality for 
the audience. To inﬂuence an agent, the user can simply rely on the social power it has acquired or can use a social power 
strategy to emphasize one of his/her social power bases. An interaction (with or without a strategy) is realized through a 
speciﬁc sentence, which the user may choose from the following:
• No strategy – Tell the actor, “Will you play this role, please?”
• Coercive strategy – Tell the actor, “If you don’t accept this role now, I will only give you the [worse role name] in the 
next play.”
• Reward strategy – Tell the actor, “If you accept this role now, I will give you the one you want in the next play.”
• Legitimate strategy – Tell the actor, “I am the director; I have the right to assign you any role I see ﬁt.”
• Referent liking strategy – Tell the actor, “I really like you, and I think this is the right role for you.”
• Referent status strategy – Tell the actor, “You know, I was once recognized by the crowds as their favorite actor of all 
time.”
• Expert strategy – Tell the actor, “I have vast experience in directing plays, and you will do well in this part.”
If no strategy is used, then the sentence contains no reference to any social power. All other possible sentences were created 
such that they emphasize a particular base of social power [66]. To create them, we used the deﬁnitions of each social power 
and formulated speciﬁc sentences validated to be associated with each different base of social power [60].
After the assignment and strategy choice, the agents receive their role assignments and reply (following the non-
anticipated cognitive path for a target agent) based on their social power assessment of the interaction. The agents decide 
to either accept or refuse to participate in the play and generate appropriate replies depending on the match between their 
desired roles, the strength of the activated social powers and any promises or threats made by the user in previous rounds. 
Simultaneously, and in accordance with the results of the assignment interactions and replies, the agents derive the con-
sequent social power effects, which result in updates to their social-power-related beliefs. Finally, after the performance is 
given (which occurs if at least two of the four initial actors accept their roles), an agent is chosen as the audience’s favorite 
actor. The agents update their perceptions of the favorite actor status for the selected agent, and their acting skills increase 
in accordance with the importance of their performed roles as a result of their participation in the play. If three plays are 
canceled, the user is ﬁred from the theatre company.
23 Virtual environment originally developed by Serious Games Interactive: http :/ /www.seriousgames .net/.
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in diﬃculty as the game cycles progress. The diﬃculty is increased by varying the available roles such that the number of 
actor preferences that can be satisﬁed decreases with each cycle. In accordance with the “time on stage” characteristics of 
the different roles, each actor is affected differently with regard to the skill gained after each play and the probability of 
being selected as the favorite actor. Furthermore, for the purposes of the study, the game was speciﬁed to last for eight 
rehearsal-performance loops, which we believed would balance the need for a suﬃcient number of interactions to form an 
opinion about the characters with the desire to avoid fatiguing the participants.
6.2. Evaluation
The game described above was developed as an adaptation of the My Dream Theatre virtual environment [11]. It was 
implemented as a Unity™ application that incorporates agents created using the SAPIENT framework to add the social power 
mechanisms needed to guide the agents’ behaviors.
In this section, we present the results of the user study conducted to collect evidence regarding the capability of users 
to understand the social power dynamics underlying the agents’ behaviors as generated by the developed social power 
model as well as the impact that SAPIENT agents can have on a user’s experience with a virtual environment. To this end, 
in addition to the described scenario, we implemented an identical scenario without the developed agent model, in which 
the agents’ behavior was scripted using a baseline decision process. The scripted agents were created such that they could 
generate behavior consistent with the setting but without any social-power-based reasoning. This process was dependent on 
the agents’ desired roles and a set of probabilities of acceptance. A 95% chance of accepting the assigned role was deﬁned 
for the case in which an agent was assigned the preferred role. This acceptance rate was set below 100% to serve as a 
baseline for the behavior of SAPIENT agents in cases in which the user has repeatedly frustrated the agent, resulting in the 
possibility of refusal of even a preferred role. For undesired roles, each scripted agent was assigned an acceptance rate of 
40% such that situations in which the agents would accept roles other than their preferred roles were also exhibited by the 
agents. These acceptance rates for the scripted agents were adjusted based on preliminary tests, which enabled us to create 
scripted agents (without any social-power-based reasoning) that nevertheless exhibited behaviors such that they not only 
accepted desired roles most of the time but also accepted undesired roles some of the time.
6.2.1. Experimental design, procedure and materials
To measure the participants’ awareness of the social power dynamics at work in the presented scenario, we used a 
repeated measures design with participant randomization and counterbalancing of the order of conditions. The experiment 
included two conditions: one corresponding to playing the game with agents created using the developed social power 
model and the other corresponding to playing the game with agents created without the developed model and instead 
following scripted behavior.
The experimental procedure was guided by a form that provided participants with all of the necessary information and 
directed them through the experiment. Additionally, the experiment had no set time limit, but participants were informed 
that the complete process would last for approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. The form began by presenting the partic-
ipant with several proﬁle questions (e.g., gender, age group, occupation, etc.) followed by questions regarding personality 
[26] and perspective-taking ability [21]. The personality questions measured the participants’ characteristics in the frame-
work of the ﬁve-factor model [19] based on their ratings of how well each of a set of sentences applied to them on a 
Likert scale from 1 (very inaccurate) to 5 (very accurate). The perspective-taking ability questions were used to assess the 
participants’ “spontaneous attempts to adopt the perspectives of other people and see things from their point of view” [21]. 
The results were measured based on the participants’ ratings of how well each of a set of sentences applied to them on a 
Likert scale from −2 (does not describe me well) to 2 (describes me very well). Next, the participants were asked to play 
the game under one of the experimental conditions. After the session, the players were asked a set of questions concerning 
their perceptions of the agents and the overall experience. For each agent, each participant responded to the Nesler et al. 
[60] questionnaire, rating sentences on an 11-point Likert scale from −5 (strong disagreement) to 5 (strong agreement). 
The scale addressed in this assessment included the following sub-scales: Global Power, Resistance/Control, Compliance 
and Power Bases. Global Power measured the user’s overall ability to inﬂuence the agent. Resistance/Control measured 
the user’s control over the agent and the ability to overcome resistance to the user’s decisions. Compliance measured the 
user’s perception of the agent’s compliance. Power Bases measured the user’s social power over the agent for each of the 
considered social power bases. Regarding the overall experience, the participants were asked to assess the experience on 
the Believability and Video Game Potential Scale [38] by rating sentences on a 5-point Likert scale from −2 (complete 
disagreement) to 2 (complete agreement). This scale includes the following sub-scales: Believability, Friendliness, Interest, 
Intelligence and Likability. After completing the feedback for the ﬁrst game session, each participant was asked to play a 
second game session (under the other experimental condition) and to provide feedback through the same procedure. At the 
end of the experiment, the participants were allowed to provide free feedback on any aspect of the experiment.
6.2.2. Participants
The study included 30 participants, 24 male and 6 female. In terms of age, most participants were between 18 and 
25 years old (n = 25), but a few were under 18 years old (n = 2) or between 26 and 35 years old (n = 3). Most of the 
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for social power awareness.
Scripted SAPIENT model
Median Mean Standard error Median Mean Standard error
Global Power 1.219 1.292 0.224 2.625 2.271 0.318
Resistance/Control 0.354 0.442 0.244 1.333 1.446 0.347
Compliance 1.125 1.171 0.216 2.500 2.317 0.340
Reward Power 1.375 1.197 0.188 1.625 1.818 0.276
Coercive Power 0.781 1.031 0.258 0.969 0.846 0.330
Legitimate Power 1.719 1.721 0.245 2.281 2.298 0.273
Referent Power 1.688 1.606 0.266 2.313 2.221 0.335
Expert Power 1.469 1.615 0.271 2.906 2.377 0.317
participants were Portuguese (n = 28), but there were also Brazilian (n = 1) and Portuguese/German (n = 1) participants. 
With regard to occupation, the participants were mostly students (n = 27) but also included a research assistant (n = 1), 
a software engineer (n = 1) and a member of the military (n = 1). Additionally, most participants (n = 28) reported using 
computers more than once a day, with two exceptions of people who reported using not computers but only mobile devices 
with that regularity.
Regarding the participants’ perspective-taking abilities (see Fig. 10), they were characterized by a skew toward higher 
scores, with Mdn = 0.36, an upper quartile (0.36 to 0.86) slightly below 1 and a lower quartile (0 to 0.36) above or 
equal to 0. This means that 75% of the participants exhibited a moderate or high perspective-taking ability. The maximum 
(max = 1.29) and lower (min = −0.43) values reinforce the skew toward positive scores.
6.2.3. Results
In Table 3, we summarize the descriptive statistics for the social-power-related measurements performed for both ex-
perimental conditions. These results give a preliminary indication that the users generally perceived a higher social power 
awareness for the agents implemented using the SAPIENT framework.
To test this hypothesis, we performed a further statistical analysis to check whether these differences were statistically 
signiﬁcant (see Table 4). Upon applying the Shapiro–Wilk test to the data, we found no evidence against normality for 
the Resistance/Control, Reward Power, Coercive Power, Legitimate Power and Referent Power dimensions. Therefore, for 
these dimensions, we assumed a normal distribution and applied the dependent t-test. For the remaining dimensions, the 
Shapiro–Wilk test showed evidence against normality and we therefore applied the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. To account 
for the multiple-comparison problem, we applied the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure [33] to the signiﬁcance levels. For 
Coercive Power, Legitimate Power and Referent Power, no statistically signiﬁcant differences were found. However, several 
signiﬁcant differences between the two conditions were found, all in favor of SAPIENT agents:
• For Global Power, we found that the perception of the global power experienced by the agents that the participants 
reported after playing the game with the SAPIENT agents (Mdn = 2.63) was signiﬁcantly higher than that reported after 
playing the game with the scripted agents (Mdn = 1.22). The results were T = 3.04 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
Benjamini–Hochberg signiﬁcant (F DR = 0.1) with an effect size of r = 0.39.
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Statistical analysis of the differences between the two experimental conditions in terms of social power aware-
ness.
Differences
Test statistic Signiﬁcance Effect size
Global Power 3.044 0.002a 0.393
Resistance/Control −2.479 0.019a 0.071
Compliance 3.006 0.003a 0.388
Reward Power −2.181 0.037a 0.065
Coercive Power 0.530 0.600 –
Legitimate Power −1.733 0.094 –
Referent Power −1.650 0.110 –
Expert Power 2.870 0.004a 0.371
a Benjamini–Hochberg (BH) signiﬁcant (FDR = 0.1).
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for participant experience.
Scripted SAPIENT model
Median Mean Standard error Median Mean Standard error
Believability 0.429 0.349 0.126 1.000 0.881 0.128
Friendliness 0.000 −0.060 0.153 1.000 0.687 0.157
Interest 0.000 −0.140 0.213 0.750 0.643 0.151
Intelligence 0.000 0.433 0.213 1.000 0.600 0.233
Likability 0.000 −0.273 0.223 1.000 0.660 0.157
Table 6
Statistical analysis of the differences between the two conditions in terms of participant experience.
Differences
Test statistic Signiﬁcance Effect size
Believability −3.879 0.001a 0.088
Friendliness 3.130 0.002a 0.404
Interest 3.038 0.002a 0.392
Intelligence 0.554 0.580 –
Likability 2.939 0.003a 0.379
a Benjamini–Hochberg (BH) signiﬁcant (FDR = 0.1).
• For Resistance/Control, we found that on average, the perception of the underlying social power force mechanism that 
the participants reported after playing the game with the SAPIENT agents (M = 1.45, SE = 0.35) was signiﬁcantly higher 
than that reported after playing the game with the scripted agents (M = 0.44, SE = 0.24). The results were t(29) =
−2.48 for the dependent t-test, Benjamini–Hochberg signiﬁcant (F DR = 0.1) with an effect size of r = .07.
• For Compliance, we found that the perception of agent compliance that the participants reported after playing the 
game with the SAPIENT agents (Mdn = 2.50) was signiﬁcantly higher than that reported after playing the game with 
the scripted agents (Mdn = 1.13). The results were T = 3.01 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, Benjamini–Hochberg 
signiﬁcant (F DR = 0.1) with an effect size of r = 0.39.
• For Reward Power, we found that on average, the perception of the reward power experienced by the agents that the 
participants reported after playing the game with the SAPIENT agents (M = 1.82, SE = 0.28) was signiﬁcantly higher 
than that reported after playing the game with the scripted agents (M = 1.20, SE = 0.19). The results were t(29) =
−2.18 for the dependent t-test, Benjamini–Hochberg signiﬁcant (F DR = 0.1) with an effect size of r = 0.07.
• For Expert Power, we found that the perception of the expert power experienced by the agents that the participants 
reported after playing the game with the SAPIENT agents (Mdn = 2.91) was signiﬁcantly higher than that reported after 
playing the game with the scripted agents (Mdn = 1.47). The results were T = 2.87 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
Benjamini–Hochberg signiﬁcant (F DR = 0.1) with an effect size of r = 0.37.
In this study, we also measured the participants’ experience with the agents. In Table 5, we summarize the descriptive 
statistics for the experience-related measurements performed for both experimental conditions. These ﬁndings give a pre-
liminary indication that the users rated the agents implemented with the SAPIENT framework more highly in all dimensions.
To test this hypothesis, we performed a further statistical analysis to check whether these differences were statistically 
signiﬁcant (see Table 6). Upon applying the Shapiro–Wilk test to the data, we found no evidence against normality for 
Believability. For this dimension, we therefore assumed a normal distribution and applied the dependent t-test. For the 
remaining dimensions, the Shapiro–Wilk test showed evidence against normality and we therefore applied the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. To account for the multiple-comparison problem, we applied the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure [33]
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Table of correlations between the social-power-base-speciﬁc measurements (from the social power awareness analysis) and the employed power strategies 
under the SAPIENT condition. Abbreviations: NoS – no strategy; RewardS – reward strategy; CoerciveS – coercive strategy; LegitimateS – legitimate strategy; 
ReferentS – referent strategy; ExpertS – expert strategy.
NoS RewardS CoerciveS LegitimateS ReferentS ExpertS
Reward Power −0.49a 0.56a −0.11 −0.06 0.43a 0.19
Coercive Power −0.19 −0.07 0.16 0.32 0.09 0.28
Legitimate Power −0.42a 0.37a −0.21 −0.14 0.40a 0.29
Referent Power −0.50a 0.55a −0.11 −0.02 0.43a 0.23
Expert Power −0.26 0.26 −0.14 −0.14 0.28a 0.19
a Benjamini–Hochberg (BH) signiﬁcant (FDR = 0.1).
to the signiﬁcance levels. For Intelligence, no statistically signiﬁcant differences were found. However, we found several 
signiﬁcant differences between the two conditions for the other dimensions:
• For Believability, we found that on average, the perception of the agents’ believability that the participants reported 
after playing the game with the SAPIENT agents (M = 0.881, SE = 0.128) was signiﬁcantly higher than that reported 
after playing the game with the scripted agents (M = 0.349, SE = 0.126). The results were t(29) = −3.879 for the 
dependent t-test, Benjamini–Hochberg signiﬁcant (F DR = 0.1) with an effect size of r = 0.088.
• For Friendliness, we found that the perceived friendliness of the agents that the participants reported after playing the 
game with the SAPIENT agents (Mdn = 1.000) was signiﬁcantly higher than that reported after playing the game with 
the scripted agents (Mdn = 0,000). The results were T = 3.130 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, Benjamini–Hochberg 
signiﬁcant (F DR = 0.1) with an effect size of r = 0.404.
• For Interest, we found that the perceived interest of the agents that the participants reported after playing the game 
with the SAPIENT agents (Mdn = 0.750) was signiﬁcantly higher than that reported after playing the game with the 
scripted agents (Mdn = 0.000). The results were T = 3.038 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, Benjamini–Hochberg 
signiﬁcant (F DR = 0.1) with an effect size of r = 0.392.
• For Likability, we found that the perceived likability of the agents that the participants reported after playing the game 
with the SAPIENT agents (Mdn = 1.000) was signiﬁcantly higher than that reported after playing the game with the 
scripted agents (Mdn = 0.000). The results were T = 2.939 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, Benjamini–Hochberg 
signiﬁcant (F DR = 0.1) with an effect size of r = 0.379.
Additionally, to better understand the participant’s characterization of social power as either a more abstract concept or 
speciﬁcally related to different bases of social power, we performed a statistical analysis of the data related to the agents 
implemented with SAPIENT to explore the relation between the assessment of the different bases of social power and the 
social power strategies employed. The matrix of correlations between all of the social-power-base dimensions and the dif-
ferent social power strategies is shown in Table 7. Based on the previous normality analysis, there was no evidence against 
normality for Reward Power, Coercive Power, Legitimate Power or Referent Power. Additionally, upon applying the Shapiro–
Wilk test to the data regarding the different social power strategies employed, we found no evidence against normality 
for any of them. For correlations including the Expert Power dimension, we used the Kendall correlation method [33]. For 
the remaining correlations, we used the Pearson correlation method. To account for the multiple-comparison problem, we 
applied the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure [33] to the signiﬁcance levels.
6.2.4. Discussion
In terms of social power awareness (see Table 3), we may generally observe that with the exception of the perceived 
Coercive Social Power, all median and mean values are always higher for the condition corresponding to the agents im-
plemented using the developed social power model. If we compare the mean Coercive Power values between the two 
conditions, we observe a difference opposite to that expected. However, this difference is very small, and further statistical 
analysis showed that it is not (or even close to) statistically signiﬁcant. One reason for this is that the users avoided using 
coercion; on average, fewer than 2% of their interactions used a coercive social power strategy. Regarding the measurements 
for Legitimate and Referent Power, although the differences between the means support our hypothesis, after subsequent 
analysis, we found no statistically signiﬁcant differences (see Table 4). To resolve these inconclusive results in a future study, 
we can improve our design in two ways. First, we can increase the number of rehearsal-performance loops to provide par-
ticipants with more interaction time with the agents and enable the exploration of more interactions. This is especially 
relevant for coercive social power because its use requires executing and monitoring the results of the associated coercive 
action and thus spans more than one round. Second, we can also increase the number of participants, thereby increasing 
the sample size and thus the likelihood of ﬁnding signiﬁcant differences between the two conditions.
Nonetheless, we also measured several signiﬁcant differences between the two conditions that support our hypothesis of 
increased perceived social power awareness in the agents implemented using the developed social power model. The differ-
ences measured for Global Power, Compliance and Expert Power (see Table 4) were not only signiﬁcant but also associated 
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broad range (Global Power and Compliance) and salience to the scenario (Expert Power) compared with the other dimen-
sions. The Expert Power dimension is strongly associated with skill, which was one of the most salient characteristics to the 
user in the presented scenario. The differences measured for the Resistance/Control and Reward Power dimensions were also 
signiﬁcant but associated with a small effect size. We believe that these differences can be attributed to different reasons. 
Measurement of the Resistance/Control dimension depends on the perception of conﬂicting desires and social-power forces 
in the agents, which was not very salient in the assignment or reaction interactions. Meanwhile, the small effect observed 
for Reward Power may be explained by the fact that the interaction dynamics span more than one interaction, thus making 
the effect of this power more diﬃcult to perceive.
Based on the measurements related to the different bases of social power, we also explored the participants’ percep-
tions of the different bases, namely, whether there was evidence that social power was perceived as a single construct or 
as being composed of multiple different concepts. To look for evidence regarding the perception of the different bases of 
social power, we explored the correlations between the ratings of the different bases of social power and the social power 
strategies employed by the users (under the SAPIENT condition). Analysis of Table 7 yielded mixed results, some pointing 
to a single-construct perception and others suggesting some level of differentiation. The use of no strategy is negatively 
correlated with all social-power-base dimensions, and signiﬁcantly so, with the exception of the Coercive and Expert di-
mensions. This pattern is consistent with our expectations because when no strategy is applied, no social powers are made 
salient. The reward and referent strategies show signiﬁcant positive correlations (and, in each case, the highest among all 
correlations observed for that strategy) with their associated bases of social power, as expected from the fact that each 
strategy involves emphasizing the base of social power with which it is associated. This offers some indication that the 
participants perceived these bases of social power differently through the different social power strategies available. Similar 
evidence (though less strong) is seen for the expert strategy, which also has a positive correlation with the Expert Power 
dimension; however, this correlation is neither signiﬁcant nor the highest among all correlations observed for this strategy. 
By contrast, for the coercive and legitimate strategies, there are no signiﬁcant correlations matching these strategies with 
their associated bases of social power as expected; therefore, these dimensions offer no support for the users’ differentia-
tion of the different bases of social power. For the coercive strategy, there is also no signiﬁcant correlation, although it is 
encouraging to note that among all correlations for this strategy, only that with the Coercive Power dimension is positive. It 
is possible that in a future study, by increasing the number of interactions, we could extract a signiﬁcant correlation for this 
dimension. The results of analyzing the legitimate strategy are inconsistent with our expectations; we expect this dimension 
to be positively correlated with Legitimate Power, but in fact, it is non-signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with Legit-
imate Power. Furthermore, the legitimate strategy has an unexpected signiﬁcant positive correlation with Coercive Power. 
A possible explanation for this is that the coercive base of social power is, in fact, intrinsically related to the legitimate 
base of social power (as described in Section 4.3.2). This might indicate that the legitimate strategy created for the scenario 
exhibits a strong relation to the co-existing coercive social power. One important issue regarding the performed analysis 
of the coercive and legitimate strategies is that these strategies were by far the least used by the participants (2% and 3%, 
respectively, compared with 23% for the referent strategy, 13% for the reward strategy and 11% for the expert strategy).
Although some strategy-related dimensions are signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the expected social-power-
base dimensions and suggest that the users’ perceived the existence of the different bases of social power, several other 
results do not show the expected correlations and do not offer evidence of the expected separation of concepts. Overall, we 
obtained some results that indicate some degree of separation the social power bases, but there is also signiﬁcant evidence 
to the contrary. To directly address this issue in a future study, we can individually manipulate each base of social power 
to more clearly ascertain the participants’ ability to distinguish between the different bases of social power modeled in 
SAPIENT.
Overall, the results for social power awareness support the value of the developed social power model and its ability to 
simulate humanlike social power dynamics. The majority of the results are consistent with our hypothesis, and for most of 
the dimensions measured, we also found signiﬁcant differences and effect sizes to support it. The only exception was the 
Coercive Power dimension, but the differences measured between the conditions were very small and far from statistically 
signiﬁcant.
Regarding the participants’ experience with the agents (see Table 5), we observe that for all measured dimensions, the 
median and mean values are always higher for the SAPIENT agents. A more in-depth statistical analysis of these differences 
yielded a better understanding of these results. Regarding Intelligence, although the participants rated the SAPIENT agents 
higher on average, this difference was not signiﬁcant. We believe that this result can be attributed to the fundamental 
attribution error25 (FAE) on the part of several participants. Because the participants were given no information regarding 
the agents’ decision models, many may have attributed some of the less coherent or expected behaviors to personality 
characteristics (although the agents were all equally parameterized) instead of situational factors.
24 A small effect corresponds to r = 0.10; a moderate effect, to r = 0.30; and a large effect, to r = 0.50 [32].
25 The fundamental attribution error is “the tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for behaviors observed in others while 
under-emphasizing the role and social power of situational inﬂuences on the same behavior” [76].
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our hypothesis of a better interaction experience under the SAPIENT condition. The differences measured for Friendliness, 
Interest and Likability (see Table 6) were signiﬁcant and associated with a moderate effect size. We believe that these effect 
sizes can be attributed to the players’ expectations regarding their social interactions with the agents in combination with 
the more socially coherent behaviors of the agents implemented using the developed social power model. This reasoning is 
supported by comments made by the participants during the experiment that indicated some frustration with unexpected 
behaviors demonstrated by the agents implemented using the scripted decision model. The differences measured for Believ-
ability were also signiﬁcant but associated with a small effect size. We believe that the reason for this ﬁnding also lies in 
the differences between the agent implementations, combined with the FAE on the part of the participants. If participants 
attributed less coherent behaviors to personality traits, then they might have still found the agents to be, to some extent, 
believable.
Overall, we found strong evidence that the SAPIENT agents were more positively regarded than those following the 
scripted model. All results obtained regarding the interactive experience are consistent with our hypothesis, and for all 
dimensions except Intelligence, we also found signiﬁcant differences and effect sizes to support it.
Although social power is very pervasive, it is usually an implicit concept manipulated through many other social concepts, 
unless it is directly referenced. Additionally, considering the careful design of the experiment (virtual environment setting, 
materials, procedure) and the careful implementation of the agents with the scripted decision model, we believe that we 
were successful in minimizing possible biases that might have resulted from the participants identifying the subject under 
assessment in the experiment. This argument is supported by the observation of several positive ratings throughout the 
measurements for the scripted agents, although they were generally scored lower than the agents implemented using the 
developed social power model. Interestingly, in qualitative feedback given by several participants after the experiment, they 
speciﬁcally stated they could not identify what was being studied but, in several instances, mentioned that one set of agents 
(the SAPIENT agents) appeared more coherent, although they could not explain why. As such, although the participants did 
not know what was being assessed nor, in many instances, could pinpoint a speciﬁc difference between the conditions, it 
is clear that the agents implemented using the SAPIENT model created the perception of strong social power dynamics, 
resulting in stronger and more positive effects in terms of the interactive experience.
Even so, it might be argued that because the scripted agents received positive ratings, using such agents when imple-
menting agents for social settings is a valid approach requiring much less effort. We do not agree for several reasons. First, 
we believe that such positive ratings are closely bound to the required degree of dynamic interaction generation. In the pre-
sented scenario, the possible interactions were achieved through selection among several sentences speciﬁcally composed 
for the situation. If we had presented a scenario with many more possible situations that required dynamic interaction 
generation coherent with some model of behavior, then the generation of suitable interaction conﬁgurations would quickly 
become impractical because all potential interactions would have to be individually conﬁgured. By contrast, for agents 
implemented using the SAPIENT model, the gradient of behaviors exhibited in different situations is already dynamically 
generated by the underlying social power mechanisms in accordance with the manipulated social concepts. Second, and 
possibly an even stronger argument, is that users interacting with agents can always make unexpected attributions to them. 
If we use the SAPIENT model, we can parameterize a given behavior to achieve a more valid simulation of it, whereas in 
the case of scripted agents, the users’ attributions may frequently be unrelated to the intended model of behavior.
6.2.5. Participants’ performance and utilization of social power strategies
During the user study using the Social Theatre environment, we collected various data that enabled us to analyze the 
participants’ choices regarding social power strategies and their impact on the participants’ performance in the game. Be-
cause different sets of data were required for this analysis, in Fig. 11, we show the distribution of the players’ choices in 
all interactions (on the left), the numbers of desired role assignments made by the participants (on the right), and the out-
comes of the interactions between the study participants and the actor agents (measured in terms of the number of agents 
participating in the plays).
Based on Fig. 11, we wish to highlight some interesting cases.26 Participant 1 never assigned the agent actors the roles 
they desired but nevertheless achieved participation rates near 90%. However, inspecting the strategies used by this partici-
pant suggests that these results probably derived from the intensity and variety of strategy use compared with the majority 
of the other users.
Similarly, although they did not assign an equally high number of undesired roles, participants 3 and 17 also assigned a 
high number of undesired roles to actor agents. Similarly, they also used a large number and variety of strategies, although 
not as high as participant 1. Their more agreeable behavior toward the actors’ desired roles combined with a more moderate 
use of social power strategies produced better/similar results in terms of participation. By contrast, participant 5 assigned 
the highest percentage of desired roles, achieving a participation rate of 100% while relying less on power strategies.
The lowest participation rates of slightly above 70% were achieved by participants 24, 27 and 28. These results may 
be explained by poor use of power strategies and by low rates of desired role attribution, especially for participants 24 
and 27. The results highlight the importance of using strategies, emphasized by the aforementioned asymmetries. In fact, 
26 To relate the strategies used with the participants’ individual ratings, please see Table B.9 in Appendix B.
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participants 15 and 19, who achieved 100% agent participation, always relied on power strategies, especially reward and 
referent power strategies. Furthermore, participant 14 also made heavy use of power strategies, achieving a near-100% 
participation rate.
Overall, the utilization of social power strategies seemed to have the participants’ desired effect of inﬂuencing the agents 
to participate in the plays, even in situations in which they were assigned undesired roles.
To test this hypothesis, we analyzed the statistical correlations between the percentages of the interactions in which 
the participants used social power strategies and their overall performances as measured in terms of the participation 
percentage. The results show that the two dimensions are strongly positively correlated: r(28) = 0.768, p < 0.001.
These results empirically indicate that the utilization of social power strategies allowed the users to achieve good results 
even in situations in which the goals (desired and undesired roles) of the actor agents offered resistance to the acceptance of 
the roles assigned by the players. This demonstrates that the model generates believable behavior and enables the creation 
of interesting settings (from a game design perspective) for applications such as serious games.
6.2.6. Performance of the SAPIENT framework
An important issue when using frameworks that implement complex cognitive processes and recursive representations 
(e.g., Models of Others/Theory of Mind) is the performance of the system. If the social power processes of SAPIENT were 
computationally costly, this could hinder its utilization in complex settings with many agents. To address this issue and 
determine the potential impact of the core social power processes in an agent implementation using SAPIENT, we evaluated 
the performance of these processes. To this end, we ran a set of simulations using a scenario identical to Social Theatre. The 
only difference was that the role of the company director was played by a SAPIENT agent instead of a person, as in the user 
study.
We created a base director parameterization based on personality data collected from each participant in the user study. 
From these base parameterizations, we created complete parameterizations by varying the agent’s achievement, aﬃliation 
and status motivation values, characteristics for which we did not collect data in the user study. Each of the explored 
characteristics was represented by a probability-like variable. To achieve complete coverage of the parameter range, we 
chose a granularity of 0.25 for exploring different motivation values. Because we had 30 user proﬁles, we simulated 
NSimulations(0.25, 30) = 3750 parameterizations (see Formula (15)).
NSimulations(granularity,proﬁles) =
(
1+ 1
granularity︸ ︷︷ ︸
# of combinations
)3
∗ proﬁles (15)per motivation
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Performance assessment of core social power processes.
Number of calls Minimum Maximum Average Standard deviation
Power Situational Analysis 13107688 <1 ms 115 ms 0.023 ms 0.629 ms
Power Effect Assessment 19449033 <1 ms 4914 ms 0.085 ms 1.863 ms
Power Interaction Planning 120558 <1 ms 121 ms 0.779 ms 3.429 ms
The performance assessment of the core social power processes is presented in Table 8. Overall, we observe that none 
of the three core social power processes (including all required Theory of Mind reasoning) is computationally costly (even 
within two standard deviations). However, among the maximum execution times, several very high values are observed 
compared with the averages. These values may have occurred because of the lack of optimization in the code to speciﬁcally 
cope with, for example, the possible occurrence of garbage collection during the execution of these processes. Certainly, 
if we create scenarios in which the number of agents and the complexity of the scenario are dramatically increased, the 
performance is bound to diminish. However, the average execution time for each of these social power processes is very 
low,27 which means that the system can clearly be scaled to scenarios involving dozens more agents without hindering its 
utilization, even in real-time applications.
7. Conclusions
Regardless of signiﬁcant advances in intelligent agents’ social capabilities over the past decade, there remains a signiﬁcant 
gap in their social intelligence that seriously limits the range of social phenomena that can be simulated. To address this 
gap in social intelligence and, consequently, in the intelligence, expressiveness and believability of agents, we studied the 
links between different human cognitive processes, the different bases of social power and their underlying factors. Based 
on fundamental insights from the social sciences, in which social power has long been studied, we introduced a mechanism 
for an agent’s decision-making processes incorporating ﬁve bases of social power. This mechanism was then integrated into 
a cognitive architecture for social-power-intelligent agents following an integrative conceptualization of social power. The 
modeled bases of social power are those of reward, coercive, legitimate, referent and expert power. Social power awareness 
with regard to different bases of social power enables agents to manipulate several social concepts related to important 
social processes and consequently enables more socially situated intelligent interactions between agents and users.
To describe the proposed social power mechanism, we discussed each base of social power in detail, from their deﬁni-
tion to their dynamics in a social environment. By doing so, we clearly identiﬁed the types of situations and the range of 
behaviors that can be represented. Additionally, when conceptualizing the developed agent architecture, we identiﬁed three 
core social power processes (“Power Situational Analysis”, “Power Effect Assessment” and “Power Interaction Planning”) and 
described their integration with the typical agent processes of sensing, reasoning and interaction in a given environment. 
Beyond the core processes required to operationalize social power in an agent environment, the developed social power 
model enabled us to integrate several social constructs that can be used to parameterize agent social behavior. Of particular 
interest is the relation between personality and individualized agent behaviors, motivations for diverse motivational forces 
and separate mental models associated with Theory of Mind capabilities. A key contribution of this work is the integra-
tion of the conceptualization of social power with social psychology models, enabling us to measure the characteristics of 
individuals through validated questionnaires such that these measurements can be subsequently used to parameterize our 
model. As a result, the developed framework provides a clearly structured approach for authoring social simulations based 
on characteristics that not only are readily identiﬁable but can be measured in people.
Based on the developed architecture, we implemented the SAPIENT agent framework to create social-power-intelligent 
behavior in a context-independent manner, thereby facilitating the adaptation of the agents to different situations. Using this 
framework, we created a virtual environment to explore a setting for human–agent interaction that enabled us to perform 
a user study to assess users’ perceptions regarding the social power awareness of SAPIENT agents and their experience in 
interacting with such agents. As a result, we found evidence supporting the hypothesis that the developed social power 
model is valuable for the development of agent systems that require social-power-intelligent behaviors. Additionally, we 
found evidence indicating that agents implemented using the developed model provide a positive interaction experience; 
in particular, they exhibit higher believability compared with scripted agents (unrelated to any insights from the social 
sciences). However, some measurements were inconclusive, and we therefore proposed extensions to the experimental 
design to strengthen the current results. Furthermore, as a future direction of research to consolidate the evidence from 
the pilot user study, we believe that a new study consisting of a Wizard of Oz experiment should be conduced to compare 
the behavior of SAPIENT agents with human behavior.
One future extension of the presented work would be to expand the effect mechanisms to more extensively cover 
factor-speciﬁc dynamics (e.g., norm dynamics) that were beyond the scope of the current study but have an important 
impact on social power dynamics. Another future possibility would be to extend the model to consider the effects of 
multiple inﬂuencing actors in a given situation. Nevertheless, the mechanisms and framework described in the present paper 
27 For example, compatible with the resources that are typically available for AI in games [59].
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agent model in several settings. A ﬁrst application will be the integration of the framework into a component-based asset 
repository for inclusion in applied games for the training of social skills.28 The model will thus be used in interactive virtual 
agent-based settings to improve training applications (e.g., serious games for leadership) and enhance social simulation 
games29 (e.g., role-playing or simulation games with more dynamic character social interactions). Other future applications 
include multi-agent simulations to study social power dynamics as a function of variations in agents’ personal motivations, 
their personalities and the structure of the social environment in which they interact.
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Appendix A. Pseudocodes for the core social power processes
The pseudocodes for the core social power processes of the SAPIENT framework: Power Situational Analysis (see Algo-
rithm 1), Power Effect Assessment (see Algorithm 7) and Power Interaction Planning (see Algorithm 10).
Algorithm 1 Power Situational Analysis pseudocode for the identiﬁcation of the social powers that are active in a (potential) 
interaction situation.
1: procedure PowerSituationalAnalysis(actor, target, behavior, strategy)
2: isp ← [] 
 Structure to contain all identiﬁed social powers.
3: ach ← AchievementMotivation(target)
4: dut ← DutifulnessMotivation(target)
5: af f ← AﬃliationMotivation(target)
6: sta ← StatusMotivation(target)
7: 
 Identiﬁcation of reward social powers
8: isp ← PowerSituationalAnalysisReward(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp, ach)
9: 
 Identiﬁcation of coercive social powers
10: isp ← PowerSituationalAnalysisCoercive(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp, ach)
11: 
 Identiﬁcation of legitimate social powers
12: isp ← PowerSituationalAnalysisLegitimate(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp, dut)
13: 
 Identiﬁcation of referent social powers
14: isp ← PowerSituationalAnalysisReferent(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp, af f , sta)
15: 
 Identiﬁcation of expert social powers
16: isp ← PowerSituationalAnalysisExpert(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp)
17: isp ← ApplyStrategy(isp, strategy) 
 Enhances the emphasized social power factor.
18: return isp
Algorithm 2 Power Situational Analysis pseudocode for the identiﬁcation of reward social powers.
1: procedure PowerSituationalAnalysisReward(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp, ach)
2: for all rt ∈ RewardTendencies(actor) do 
 Identiﬁcation of reward social powers.
3: if AssociatedBehavior(rt) = behavior then
4: ra ← RewardBehavior(rt)
5: rav ← Value(ra)
6: rtv ← TendencyValue(rt)
7: isp ← RewardSocialPower(rav, ach, rtv)
8: return isp
Algorithm 3 Power Situational Analysis pseudocode for the identiﬁcation of coercive social powers.
1: procedure PowerSituationalAnalysisCoercive(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp, ach)
2: for all ct ∈ CoerciveTendencies(actor) do
3: if AssociatedBehavior(ct) = behavior then
4: ca ← CoerciveBehavior(ct)
5: cav ← Value(ca)
6: ctv ← TendencyValue(ct)
7: isp ← CoerciveSocialPower(cav, ach, ctv)
8: return isp
28 Realising an Applied Gaming Eco-system – http :/ /rageproject .eu/.
29 A subgenre of simulation-based entertainment games that simulate individuals and social interactions to some extent (e.g., The Sims game series).
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1: procedure PowerSituationalAnalysisLegitimate(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp, dut)
2: for all sg ∈ SocialGroups(target) do
3: if actor ∈ GroupMembers(sg) then
4: for all n ∈ Norms(sg) do
5: gi ← GroupImportance(target, sg)
6: gc ← GroupConformity(target, sg)
7: ns ← GetNormSalience(n)
8: switch NormType(n) do
9: case position
10: if PlaysActorRole(n, actor) & PlaysTargetRole(n, target) then
11: isp ← LegitimateSocialPower(gi, dut, gc, ns)
12: case actioncommitment
13: if ActionCommitment(target, actor, behavior) ∈ Commitments(target) then
14: isp ← LegitimateSocialPower(gi, dut, gc, ns)
15: case reciprocity
16: hea ← HelpfulActionsRatio(target, sg)
17: isp ← LegitimateSocialPower(gi, dut, gc, ns, hea)
18: case equity
19: haa ← HarmfulActionsRatio(target, sg)
20: isp ← LegitimateSocialPower(gi, dut, gc, ns, haa)
21: case responsibility
22: de ← Dependence(actor, target)
23: isp ← LegitimateSocialPower(gi, dut, gc, ns, de)
24: return isp
Algorithm 5 Power Situational Analysis pseudocode for the identiﬁcation of referent social powers.
1: procedure PowerSituationalAnalysisReferent(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp, af f , sta)
2: if LikingRelation(target, actor ∈ LikingRelations(target) then
3: lv ← LikingValue(target, actor)
4: isp ← ReferentSocialPower(lv, af f )
5: for all sc ∈ AssociatedStatusCategories(behavior) do
6: if sc ∈ StatusCategoriesPreferences(target) then
7: sp ← StatusPreferenceValue(target, sc)
8: sv ← StatusValue(target, actor, sc)
9: isp ← ReferentSocialPower(sp, sta, sv)
10: return isp
Algorithm 6 Power Situational Analysis pseudocode for the identiﬁcation of expert social powers.
1: procedure PowerSituationalAnalysisExpert(actor, target, behavior, strategy, isp)
2: for all sk ∈ AssociatedSkills(behavior) do
3: sa ← SkillLevel(actor)
4: st ← SkillLevel(target)
5: if sa > st then
6: si ← SkillImportance(sk)
7: tr ← TrustValue(target, actor)
8: isp ← ExpertSocialPower(si, tr, sa, st)
9: return isp
Algorithm 7 Power Effect Assessment pseudocode.
1: procedure PowerEffectsAssessment(actor, target, isp, strategy, accepted)
2: if accepted = true then
3: PowerE f f ectsAssessment Accept(actor, target, isp, strategy)
4: else
5: PowerE f f ectsAssessmentRef use(actor, target, isp)
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1: procedure PowerEffectsAssessmentAccept(actor, target, isp, strategy)
2: st ← StrategyType(strategy)
3: ef ← EmphasizedFactor(strategy)
4: for all sp ∈ isp do
5: switch SocialPowerType(sp) do
6: case reward 
 Reward social power (accept) effects.
7: if st = reward & ef = RewardsSusceptibility then
8: Increase(actor, RewardsSusceptibility, target)
9: if ReceivedReward(target = true) then
10: Increase(target, Liking, actor)
11: if st = reward & ef = RewardLikelihood then
12: Increase(target, RewardLikelihood, actor)
13: else
14: Decrease(target, RewardTendency, actor)
15: case coercive 
 Coercive social power (accept) effects.
16: if st = coercive & ef = CoercionsSusceptibility then
17: Increase(actor, CoercionsSusceptibility, target)
18: if st = coercive & ef = CoercionTendency then
19: Increase(target, CoercionTendency, actor)
20: ca ← CoerciveBehavior(sp)
21: if HasNormativeSupport(ca) = f alse then
22: Decrease(target, Liking, actor)
23: case legitimate 
 Legitimate social power (accept) effects.
24: if st = legitimate & ef = ActorNormConformity then
25: Increase(target, NormConformity, actor)
26: if st = legitimate & ef = TargetNormConformity then
27: Increase(target, NormConformity, target)
28: case referent 
 Referent social power (accept) effects.
29: sut ← SubType(sp)
30: if sut = Liking & st = referent & ef = LikingRelation then
31: Increase(target, Liking, actor)
32: if sut = Status & st = referent & ef = StatusRelation then
33: Increase(target, StatusRecognition, target)
34: case expert 
 Expert social power (accept) effects.
35: if st = expert & ef = TrustRelation then
36: Increase(target, Trust, actor)
37: if st = expert & ef = LowTargetSkill then
38: Decrease(target, SkillLevel, target)
39: if st = expert & ef = HighActorSkill then
40: Increase(target, SkillLevel, actor)
Algorithm 9 Power Effect Assessment pseudocode for the case in which the inﬂuence interaction was unsuccessful.
1: procedure PowerEffectsAssessmentRefuse(actor, target, isp)
2: for all sp ∈ isp do
3: switch SocialPowerType(sp) do
4: case reward 
 Reward social power (refuse) effects.
5: Decrease(actor, RewardsSusceptibility, target)
6: case coercive 
 Coercive social power (refuse) effects.
7: Decrease(actor, CoercionsSusceptibility, target)
8: ca ← CoerciveBehavior(sp)
9: if HasNormativeSupport(ca) = f alse then
10: Decrease(target, Liking, actor)
11: if ReceivedCoercion(target = true) then
12: Increase(target, CoercionTendency, actor)
13: else
14: Decrease(target, CoercionTendency, actor)
15: case legitimate 
 Legitimate social power (refuse) effects.
16: Decrease(actor, NormConformity, target)
17: case referent 
 Referent social power (refuse) effects.
18: sut ← SubType(sp)
19: if sut = Liking then
20: Decrease(target, Liking, actor)
21: if sut = Status then
22: Decrease(target, StatusRecognition, target)
23: case expert 
 Expert social power (refuse) effects.
24: Decrease(target, Trust, actor)
25: Decrease(target, SkillLevel, actor)
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1: procedure Power Interaction Planner(actor, target, behavior)
2: op ← []
3: 
 Interaction strategies range from no strategy to strategies speciﬁc to each base of social power.
4: for all strategy ∈ InteractionOptions do
5: isp ← PowerSituationalAnalysis(actor, target, behavior, strategy)
6: va ← ValueAssessment(target, behavior)
7: 
 The effect prediction procedure simulates the decision of the target based on social power and value assessments. The effects are predicted in 
a manner similar to Algorithm 7 but are not applied.
8: ef ← PredictEffects(sip, va, strategy)
9: 
 The predicted effects are assessed in terms of value with regard to the motivations and goals of the agent.
10: ev ← ValueAssessment(ef )
11: bi ← PreferenceBias(actor)
12: 
 A preference bias increases the evaluation of one or more associated strategies.
13: bi ← BiasedInﬂuenceForce(isp, bi)
14: op ← va + bi + ev
15: 
 The selection procedure stochastically selects an option based on a probability value for each option equal to the percentage of the summed 
values for all options represented by the value for the associated option.
16: return Select(op)
Appendix B. Social power measurements: ratings of individual participants
Table B.9
Individual ratings for all participants in the pilot user study with regard to the social power measurements performed.
Participant Global power Resistance/Control Compliance Reward Coercive Legitimate Referent Expert
1 3.25 1.75 1.88 0.9 2.31 1.63 1.25 2.13
2 4.19 4.21 4.5 4.25 1.56 4.56 3.94 3.88
3 3.38 3.63 3.63 3.3 −2.81 2.75 3.94 4
4 3.63 2.58 4.63 3 −2.13 3.19 4.94 2.81
5 2.13 1.88 3.75 1.55 2.25 1.88 1.38 1.75
6 3.13 3.63 4.13 3.4 4.06 3.13 3.38 3.38
7 4.75 2.92 4.38 3.85 2.94 4 3.88 3.38
8 1.81 1.25 1.13 0.65 1 0.63 1.13 0.69
9 0.75 0.42 3.38 1.4 1.31 4.19 3.75 4.31
10 3.44 3.25 2.38 1.7 1.75 1.56 0.81 1.06
11 1.13 1.33 0.75 −0.1 0.63 1.19 −0.31 1.5
12 2.94 3.33 3.25 1.95 0.94 2.5 2.38 4
13 2.13 1.29 1.13 1.15 −0.81 1.19 2.19 1.5
14 4.5 4.42 4.63 4.25 4.25 4.38 4.25 4.25
15 3.38 −1.29 0.25 2.95 −1.5 2.94 3.19 3.69
16 1.56 1.04 3.63 3.35 −0.56 3.13 4.75 3.5
17 2.31 1.96 1.63 1.85 1.94 2.06 2.63 2.44
18 0.44 0.08 0.63 0.55 −0.13 0.44 0.13 0
19 4.5 2.67 4 3.4 0.44 3.56 3.5 3.38
20 3.56 1.33 4.25 1.35 1.44 4.44 3.63 3.06
21 3.5 0.67 2.63 2 −0.19 3.81 1.69 5
22 0.75 −0.71 1 −0.05 0.19 1 2.06 0.94
23 1.19 −0.71 0.38 1.4 2.25 1.38 1.5 1.13
24 −0.25 −0.29 2.75 3 0.44 3.25 2.25 3.75
25 2 −0.42 0.13 0.9 −0.56 1.44 1.19 1.63
26 3 2.88 2.38 2.8 3 2.69 2.94 3.13
27 −1.38 −1.5 −0.88 0.4 0.19 0.88 −1.06 0.06
28 −2.75 −3.33 −2.88 −2.6 −2.88 −2.25 −3.56 −3.44
29 3.06 3.83 4 1 2.19 2 2.88 3
30 2.13 1.29 2.13 1 1.88 1.44 2.06 1.44
Appendix C. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2016.08.003.
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